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Illinois Public Pension Reform: What’s Past 
Is Prologue 
By, Eric Madiar 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In December 2013, after three years of contentious debate, the Illinois General 
Assembly enacted sweeping pension legislation via Public Act 98-0599 to reduce 
the pension benefits of current and retired teachers, State and university 
employees, legislators, and elected State officials.[1] The legislation—which was 
the culmination of events beginning in 2010, when the legislature lowered the 
benefits of employees hired after January 1, 2011[2]—broke a political stalemate 
over competing bills and views on how to address the State’s underfunded pension 
systems.[3] 
The 2013 legislation was also the product of aggressive lobbying efforts by Illinois’ 
business community, principally the Commercial Club of Chicago (the “Club”), to 
cut the benefits of current and retired employees.[4] Although the Club recognized 
that the State’s failure to properly fund the State-funded pension systems was the 
primary cause of those systems’ underfunding,[5] the Club stated it would be 
“unfair to require taxpayers to bear the costs of the current pension programs for 
the State’s employees.”[6] As Eden Martin, then-Club President, stated to Club 
members, paying these obligations was politically unpalatable because “State 
Government couldn’t cut—and nobody could stand the thought of a tax 
increase.”[7] Ty Fahner, Martin’s successor, put it even more bluntly: “[I]t is 
fundamentally unfair to ask 95 percent of us—all of those who are not in one of the 
State’s five pension systems—to pay for the 5 percent who benefit from those 
plans.”[8] 
Public employees and retirees, however, have a much different perspective and 
view Public Act 98-0599 and other unilateral efforts to cut benefits as morally and 
legally irresponsible.[9] They point out that “almost 80% of [public sector] 




workers are ineligible for Social Security, making pensions their only reliable 
means of retirement security.”[10] They note that the State’s unfunded pension 
liabilities are not their fault because they have historically paid their fair share of 
the normal cost of benefits through payroll deductions.[11] If fault must be 
assigned, then they contend it is well-established that fault principally rests with 
past governors and General Assemblies that, for decades, used the moneys the 
State should have contributed to the pension system to fund public services, such 
as education, healthcare, and public safety, and stave off the need for tax increases, 
services cuts or both.[12] 
In other words, the State’s underfunding of the pension system has, for decades, 
served as a proverbial credit card that benefitted taxpayers and elected officials 
alike by relieving them of (i) the short term burden of tax increases, service cuts or 
both, and (ii) the long term burden of fixing a State fiscal system that generates 
insufficient revenue to pay for public services and cover the State’s actuarially-
required pension contributions.[13] As a result, public employees and retirees 
contend that the State cannot repudiate its pension obligations simply because 
meeting those obligations now presents the State with politically and economically 
difficult choices.[14] 
This Article chronicles the history of public pension funding in Illinois to give 
proper context to the Illinois Constitution’s Pension Clause, the General 
Assembly’s recent legislation, and the pending legal challenges to that 
legislation.  To that end, the Article first considers the causes of the State’s 
underfunded pension systems.  It then provides an overview of the Illinois 
Constitution’s Pension Clause, which presents a significant legal obstacle to the 
legislation.  Against this backdrop, the Article summarizes and discusses the main 
provisions of Public Act 98-0599.  It then provides an update on the five lawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of Public Act 98-0599 pending in the Circuit 
Court of Sangamon County, Illinois as of September 2014.  Finally, the Article 
offers concluding comments on three main legal issues involving the 
constitutionality of Public Act 98-0599: (1) whether the 3% compounded cost of 
living adjustment (or “COLA”) that is part of a person’s base pension qualifies as a 
protected “benefit” under the Pension Clause; (2) whether persons receiving a 
pension before the 3% compounded COLA became law in August 1989 could claim 
that the COLA rate increase is a protected “benefit”; and (3) whether the Pension 
Clause is subject to a police or reserved powers exception.  As detailed below, the 
Pension Clause, as with other constitutional prohibitions and positive mandates 
found in the Illinois Constitution, does not yield to claims of necessity, and the 
likelihood that Public Act 98-0599 will pass legal muster is remote at best. 
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II. ILINOIS’ LONG HISTORY OF UNDERFUNDING PUBLIC 
PENSIONS 
A.  State and Municipal Pension Funds Were Chronically Underfunded 
Long Before the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention 
For public officials and the general public, Illinois’ underfunded State and 
municipal pension systems are a well-known problem and hardly a surprise.  What 
is surprising, however, is how long the lack of proper funding has been the primary 
cause of that problem.  The discussion that follows reviews the history of that 
problem. 
In 1917, in a report commissioned by the General Assembly, the Illinois Pension 
Laws Commission described the condition of the State and municipal pension 
systems as “one of insolvency” and “moving toward crisis” because the “financial 
provisions [were] entirely inadequate for paying the stipulated pensions when 
due.”[15] The Commission recommended that the General Assembly adopt a 
“reserve plan” whereby the amount needed to pay pensions when due “should be 
set aside at the time service is rendered” by the State and municipalities so “each 
generation of taxpayers pays its own obligations for services rendered.”[16] 
In 1919, in a subsequent report, the Commission reiterated this conclusion, 
detailed how the “reserve plan” would operate, and reviewed the legal protections 
provided to public pensions in Illinois and elsewhere.[17] That legal analysis 
found, in part, that pension benefits were gratuities, and that pension funds were 
not held in trust to pay pension amounts due, but could be devoted to other 
purposes.[18] Interestingly, concerns over the State and municipalities raiding the 
pension funds to spend the moneys on other purposes later led the delegates to the 
1922 Illinois Constitutional Convention to include a provision that would prohibit 
such action, as a first attempt to protect pension benefits constitutionally.[19] The 
proposed 1922 Constitution, though, was rejected by voters and not adopted.[20] 
Decades later, in 1945, the General Assembly created the Illinois Public Employees 
Pension Laws Commission to again study the financial condition of State and 
municipal pension systems and to advise the legislature and the public on trends, 
best practices, and proposed changes to those systems.[21] From 1947 through 
1969, the Pension Commission issued a series of biennial reports with dire 
warnings of the pension systems’ impending insolvency, the growth of unfunded 
pension liabilities, and the significant burden these liabilities posed for “present 
and future generations of taxpayers.”[22] The Commission observed that 
“[p]ension obligations [were] not contingent or speculative” but “fixed debts which 
ultimately must be paid.”[23] The Commission stated that the size of these 




obligations would place a great demand on future tax revenues and needed to be 
considered in concert with “budgetary needs for other governmental functions and 
services which [were] steadily increasing.”[24] In both its 1965 and 1969 reports, 
the Commission further stated that these obligations rested “exclusively upon 
government as the employer” and “must be met by public funds derived from 
future taxation.”[25] 
The Commission reported that the unfunded liabilities were primarily due to 
inadequate pension contributions made by the State and municipalities as public 
employers.[26] In a statement to Governor William Stratton in 1957, the 
Commission stated: “[w]hereas many states, particularly those adjoining the State 
of Illinois, have provided for full or substantially complete funding of pension 
plans, Illinois has been woefully derelict in this regard.”[27] The Commission 
observed in its 1955 report that the State appropriations to the five State pension 
funds had “fallen far short of full funding requirements” because of “increased 
demands upon the State for essential services in many areas.”[28] In reports from 
both 1961 and 1969, the Commission further observed that these appropriations 
were “arbitrary,” “grossly insufficient,” and “below mandatory statutory 
requirements as expressly provided in the governing laws.”[29] Indeed, in 1969, 
the Commission declared that Illinois stood “foremost in the United States in the 
maintenance and perpetuation of an inherently unsound and unworkable policy of 
administration for its public employees.”[30] 
As a consistent and repeated recommendation beginning in 1947, the Commission 
stated it was “imperative” that the State and municipalities budget and fund their 
pension costs as employees rendered service, and that the General Assembly enact 
actuarially-sound funding requirements to retire existing and future 
liabilities.[31] In the Commission’s view, there was “no short cut method to 
financing pensions.”[32] This recommendation, however, went unheeded by the 
General Assembly partially because of “the unwarranted objections of certain civic 
organizations to the allocation of proper revenues” to the pension funds.[33] 
The Commission found it “regrettable” that despite the obvious relationship 
existing between governmental finance and the pension obligations, “public 
officials still fail[ed] or refuse[d] to recognize that pension obligations have a direct 
and immediate relationship to the entire fiscal structure of their respective 
government units.”[34] As early as 1957, the Commission asked rhetorically: “[i]f 
the State of Illinois and the local governments are today resisting the full or 
substantial financing of pension obligations under present conditions of economic 
prosperity, [then] how much more unfavorable will be the financial status of the 
funds when the obligations mature in greater proportions and the economic 
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conditions may not be as promising?”[35] The Commission later remarked that it 
“would be unfortunate indeed if the pension expectancies of thousands of 
employees and dependents are impaired in the future because of the present policy 
of government to defer costs.”[36] The Commission cautioned that “this is 
precisely what may occur if required changes [were] not made to provide for 
financing the pension funds in accordance with their accruing requirements.”[37] 
In addition to studying the financial status of the State and municipal pension 
funds, the Commission contrasted (i) Illinois’ treatment of pension as “gratuities” 
with (ii) other states’ protection of public pension benefits under a contractual 
theory throughstate constitutional provisions or court decisions.[38] The 
Commission explained in its 1961 report that benefits deemed “gratuities” created 
“no contractual rights for the members” and “no vested rights in the continuance 
of the plan or in the maintenance of any particular benefit schedule” because the 
plan and its benefit terms rested “entirely within the discretion of the legislative 
body that created them.”[39] 
By 1969, the Commission reported that the General Assembly Retirement System 
(GARS) was 68.5% funded, while the State University Retirement System (SURS) 
was 47% funded.[40] The remaining three funds were funded at the following 
percentages: State Employees Retirement System (SERS) 43%; Judicial 
Retirement System (JRS) 32.3%; and Teachers Retirement System (TRS) 
40%.[41] Overall, the five State pension systems were 41.8% funded in 1969, while 
today the systems are similarly 41.1% funded as noted on Chart 1 below.[42] 





As noted in Chart 2 below, in 1970, the five State pension systems had unfunded 
liabilities of $1.46 billion, whereas the systems presently have $97.4 billion in 
unfunded liabilities. 
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In addition, in 1969, the downstate police and firemen pension funds were 
respectively funded at 33.8% and 19.1%[43]The City of Chicago’s five pension 
funds were funded at the following percentages: Police (34.6%); Firemen (50.6%); 
Laborers (81.9%); Municipal Employees (56.9%); and Teachers (32.7%).[44] 
It was against this background that the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 
(“Convention”) convened in Springfield between December 8, 1969 and September 
3, 1970, prompting the delegates to add the Pension Clause to the Illinois 
Constitution.[45] As the Illinois Supreme Court recently observed, the delegates 
were “mindful that in the past, appropriations to cover state pension obligations 
had ‘been made a political football’ and ‘the party in power would just use the 
amount of the state contribution to help balance budgets,’ jeopardizing the 
resources available to meet the State obligations to participants in its pension 
systems in the future.”[46] 
As a result, one of the purposes of the Clause was to bar the State from relying on 
the consequences of its failure to properly fund the pension system as a basis for 
cutting or repudiating it pension obligations.[47] Delegate Green, one of the 
Clause’s two principal sponsors, explained how in 1964 the New Jersey Supreme 
Court rejected constitutional protection of pension benefits under a contractual 
theory and upheld a statute unilaterally cutting the benefits of police and 




firefighters because of chronic underfunding and insufficient assets to pay both 
present and future retirees.[48] Delegate Green pointed out that New Jersey’s 
underfunding occurred because State contributions to its pension systems “were 
not related to the ultimate cost of pension benefits,” just like in Illinois.[49] What 
happened in New Jersey, according to Delegate Green, “[was] basically what the 
people of Illinois—or the public employees of Illinois—are very fearful of.”[50] 
B.  Chronic Underfunding Continued After The Pension Clause’s Adoption 
in 1970 
After the Pension Clause’s adoption, the Commission continued to report on the 
precarious status of the pension systems until it was abolished in 1984 and its 
duties transferred to the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission.[51] As with its 
reports prior to 1970, the Pension Commission reported that “[c]ontributions by 
governmental employers [were] still below the level which might be considered 
adequate for the accruing requirements of the pension funds.”[52] The 
Commission reiterated that its “primary concern” was the imperative need for “a 
realistic financial policy, consistent with recognized principles on the part of both 
the State of Illinois and the local governments which will produce adequate 
revenues for the financial needs of these funds.”[53] 
The Commission explained that for over 30 years it had advocated actuarial 
funding of the public retirement systems and insisted that “the State pay not only 
its share of the current service cost but additional amounts which would amortize 
the unfunded liability over a period of 30 or 40 years.”[54] The Commission noted 
that because reaching “100% funding was probably impossible to attain . . .  it 
recommended funding at a two-thirds level in the belief that a one-third unfunded 
liability would be manageable in terms of future State appropriations as annual 
payout obligations increased.”[55] The Commission stated that “[w]hen legislative 
and executive indifference or hostility prevented implementation of this modified 
funding principle,” it recommended the State pension contributions meet current 
service costs plus interest on the unfunded accrued liability to preclude further 
growth in that liability and to moderate the State’s subsequent annual payment 
obligations.[56] The Commission further stated that while this recommendation 
was codified in 1967 as the statutory funding plan for the State Universities 
Retirement System, the State failed to follow that funding plan as well as the 
statutory funding requirements for the other State-supported pension 
funds.[57] That failure, according to the Commission, was “largely, though not 
exclusively, responsible for the increasing level of unfunded accrued 
liabilities.”[58] 
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Undaunted, the Commission continued to advocate through the 1970s and 1980s 
that the State and municipalities budget and fund their obligations as employees 
rendered service and in line with actuarially sound principles by paying the 
“normal cost plus interest” on unfunded liabilities.[59] Under this funding 
approach, the State and municipalities, as public employers, would make 
contributions covering the current cost of benefits accrued by employees each year 
(i.e., “normal cost”) as well as the cost associated with the interest due on unfunded 
liabilities (i.e., “plus interest on unfunded liability”).[60] Under this funding 
approach, unfunded liabilities would not be reduced, but would remain a fixed 
amount that would “shrink as a percentage of payroll or total liabilities.”[61] The 
Commission explained that “this is approach is considered to be acceptable for 
public retirement systems where permanence can be taken for granted and full 
funding is not regarded as essential.”[62] 
The Commission cautioned once more that at some point the “cost requirements 
for pension may become too burdensome to government,” in which case it may be 
“necessary to limit services of government or reduce pension payouts.”[63] The 
Commission noted, however, that a “reduction of pension payouts or established 
pension commitments may be difficult or impossible” under the Pension 
Clause.[64] The Commission explained that the Clause “created a contractual 
vested right in public employee pensions” that “may not be diminished or 
impaired.”[65] The Commission further explained that under the Clause, “[o]nce 
a bill is enacted providing for increased pension credits and improved benefits, a 
definite legal obligation is established which cannot be removed or repealed.”[66] 
Accordingly, the Commission sharply criticized the funding policy the legislature 
began using in Fiscal Year 1973 to fund the State’s five pension systems.[67] Under 
that policy, the General Assembly made employer contributions to the systems 
equal to 100% of what the systems were expected to “pay-out” in benefits each 
year.  Under the “100% payout” policy, State pension contributions matched 
benefit payment amounts while “leaving employee contributions to at least 
stabilize, if not decrease, the systems’ future unfunded liabilities.”[68] The 
Commission called the “payout” policy “unacceptable since it result[ed] in a 
deferment of the burden of financing currently incurred benefit obligations to 
future generations of taxpayers” and “appreciably greater costs to 
government.”[69] 
Rubin Cohn, a long-time Commission member, explained in the Commission’s 
1975-1977 report that the “payout” policy was flawed because benefit payouts were 
expected to sharply increase in future years.[70] As Cohn put it, “it requires an 
article of faith to believe that these enormous annual pension requirements will be 




met from revenue increases occasioned by normal economic growth even as 
supplemented by new or increased State taxes and that they will reflect a 
reasonable percentage of the State’s budget needs for all State purposes.”[71] Cohn 
found this prospect unlikely, especially since “[n]either candidate for governor in 
1976, nor candidates for legislative office proposed new taxes or an increase in 
existing taxes” to meet a $50 million shortfall in education funding based on a $10 
billion State budget.[72] The only way to avoid such a “crushing” burden on 
taxpayers was for the legislature to adopt an actuarially sound funding 
policy.[73] To not adopt such a policy would ultimately lead to the “progressive 
depletion of the system and its ultimate insolvency and bankruptcy.”[74] 
In 1979, Governor Jim Thompson’s administration echoed Cohn’s concerns in a 
report prepared for his office by an outside consultant examining the State’s 
pension system.[75] The report stated that financing Illinois’ pension obligations 
had “reached crisis proportions” because funding benefit payouts had “increased 
dramatically in recent years.”[76] The report noted that “Moody’s and Standard 
and Poor’s have expressed concern regarding the continuing increase of unfunded 
pension liabilities in Illinois,” and that Illinois would jeopardize its “AAA bond 
rating” if “the unfunded liability is not stabilized.”[77] As with the Commission, the 
report recommended that the State adopt the “normal cost plus interest” funding 
approach, but phase it in to accommodate other budgetary objectives.[78] 
Despite these warnings, the General Assembly used the “payout” policy to fund the 
State’s five pension systems in fiscal years 1973 through 1981.[79] Treasurer Judy 
Baar Topinka stated in May 2011 that although this funding method “had no 
relation to actuarial calculations of liability, it did guarantee a steady increase in 
State contributions.”[80] This funding policy, because of higher than expected 
investment returns,[81] helped increase the funding ratio of these systems from 
41.8% at the time of 1970 Constitutional Convention to 48.6% in 1979 as noted on 
Chart 1.[82] 
C.  Pension Underfunding Was Further Aggravated During Governor 
Thompson’s Tenure 
In March 1981, Governor Jim Thompson, however, announced that the State 
would abandon the “100% payout” policy in fiscal year 1982 as a “budget savings 
measure.”[83] In its place, the State would contribute 60% of the estimated benefit 
payouts made by the five State pension systems.[84] Indeed, between fiscal years 
1982 and 1995, pegging State pension contributions to at or below 60% of payout 
became the State’s de facto funding policy.[85] During that period, “state pension 
contributions declined sharply in fiscal years 1982 and 1983 and increased 
modestly through fiscal year 1995.”[86] These State contributions were well below 
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the employer’s actuarial cost of benefits accrued each year, with contributions 
fluctuating between 30% and 66% of actuarial cost.[87] Treasurer Topinka 
observed that this policy shift “aggravated” the pension funding problem.[88] The 
Chicago Tribune reported that the Thompson administration “rationed spending 
on pensions so that scarce state resources could be put toward more pressing and 
voter-pleasing needs.”[89] As Governor Thompson’s legislative lobbyist, Jim 
Edgar explained: “The state was trying to pay for all these services people wanted 
on the cheap.”[90] 
In addition to abandoning the “100% payout” policy, Governor Thompson 
successfully passed legislation in 1982 that made investment returns the largest 
funding source for the pension systems.[91] The legislation was an outgrowth of a 
study he commissioned in 1982 recommending that the pension systems be 
allowed to make investments under the prudent investor rule, rather than from a 
short list of statutorily-approved types of securities, such as government 
bonds.[92] The study explained that, “[t] he taxpayers and citizens of the state, 
upon whom the ultimate responsibility for financing the [pension] system rests, 
have a clear interest in an investment policy that generates maximum resources 
and relieves pressure on the tax base to increase contributions.”[93] The study 
stated that if the three largest State pension funds “had achieved the same 8.6% 
market rate of return as the average U.S. pension fund did in the past five years, 
total investments would have been approximately $875 million greater. This could 
have been used to reduce the taxpayers’ burden; to provide additional benefits; or, 
to increase the overall funding ratio another 8%.”[94] The study also highlighted 
how Governor Thompson in 1981 signed into law legislation permitting the State 
pension systems to invest in mortgaged-backed securities, and noted the program 
established by South Shore Bank of Chicago to assemble and sell packaged 
mortgages.[95] The Taxpayers’ Federation of Illinois pointed out, however, that 
this shift in investment policy now made the pension systems dependent upon “the 
most volatile revenue” source because it directly depends “upon the vagaries of the 
economy to a greater degree than” State employer or employee contributions.[96] 
In 1985, Governor Thompson convened a task force to investigate the funding 
status of the State pension systems and propose an alternative funding method to 
replace the 60% payout policy.[97] The task force proposed a new funding policy 
requiring the State to pay “vested” pension liabilities over a 40 year basis, but was 
viewed as little different from the 60% payout policy.[98] The task force also 
considered the impact of pension underfunding on the State’s credit rating and 
found that Standard and Poors reduced its rating from AAA to AA+ due to the 
State’s “deferral of pension obligations.”[99] Indeed, the report noted that one 




rating agency expressed concern that the State’s pension funding was a potential 
“time bomb” for the future.[100] 
In 1988, the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission determined that staying on 
the 60% payout policy would ultimately cut into available revenues for schools, 
human services, and other programs.[101] The Fiscal Commission recommended 
that the legislature adopt a funding policy requiring the State to pay the normal 
cost of benefits when incurred plus an amount needed to pay off the unfunded 
liability over 40 years as a level percentage of payroll.[102] 
In 1989, the General Assembly enacted a version of this plan to begin in fiscal year 
1990.[103] Under that plan, the State’s contribution would be “increased 
incrementally over a seven year period so that by FY 1996 the minimum 
contribution to be made by the State would be an amount sufficient to meet the 
normal cost [of benefits] and amortize the unfunded liability over 40 years, as a 
level percentage of payroll.”[104] State Comptroller Dawn Clark Netsch stated that 
this plan failed because the governor and legislature never made the 
appropriations needed to meet the plan’s funding requirements.[105] 
Indeed, between fiscal years 1990 and 1995, over $1.4 billion in moneys needed to 
fund the plan were used on other State budget priorities.[106] In testimony before 
Congress in 1991, Comptroller Netsch stated that Illinois’ pension problem was 
“underfunding” and that “[u]nderappropriated pension contributions [were] like 
unpaid credit card bills” that ultimately must be paid.[107] To highlight this point, 
Netsch noted how the legislature permitted  Governor Jim Edgar to divert $21 
million from moneys otherwise automatically transferred into the State’s pension 
system to the State’s General Revenue Fund for expenditure on other State 
programs.[108] She added that, “[o]ur problems might be more understandable if 
our retirement systems provided extravagant benefits, but they do not.  We are 
having trouble facing our obligations for systems that have some of the lowest 
benefit levels in the county.”[109] By 1994, the systems’ unfunded liabilities had 
grown from $8.2 billion in 1989 to $17 billion (See Chart 2) and the systems’ 
funding percentage dropped from 60% to 54% (See Chart 1). 
D.  The 1995 Funding Plan By Design Increased Unfunded Pension 
Liabilities 
In 1994, the health and underfunding of the State’s pension systems became a 
significant political issue for Governor Jim Edgar in his bid for re-election.[110] In 
February 1994, the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission reported that 
because of insufficient State contributions and not following the 1989 funding 
plan, the General Assembly Retirement System (GARS) was selling assets to cover 
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benefit payments to annuitants.[111] The Fiscal Commission stated that, if the 
State’s inadequate funding practices continued, GARS would be insolvent by fiscal 
year 2008 and the financial status of the State’s four other pension systems would 
begin to rapidly deteriorate in fiscal year 2013.[112] State Comptroller Netsch, the 
Democratic candidate for Governor, severely criticized Edgar for not adhering to 
the 1989 pension funding plan and labeled him a “charge-and-spend bureaucrat” 
who put “our massive pension deficit on the state’s credit card.”[113] 
In response, Edgar unveiled in his budget address a fifty year pension funding plan 
that would phase in increased State pension contributions over the first twenty 
years and ultimately achieve 90% funding in fiscal year 2045.[114] Netsch 
countered with her own plan with a 10 year phase in of increased State 
contributions and stated that Edgar’s plan would add $38 billion more to the State 
unfunded pension liabilities.[115] Edgar replied that his plan was “affordable” 
while Netsch’s plan called for additional pension funding the State needed for 
education and child welfare programs.[116] 
In June 1994, the General Assembly and Governor Edgar reached an agreement 
on a new pension funding plan modeled after Edgar’s proposal beginning in 
1995.[117] The 1995 funding plan was later signed into law as Public Act 88-593 in 
August 1994.[118] The legislation created a 50-year plan to achieve 90% funding 
of the State’s five pension systems by fiscal year 2045.[119] The legislation 
included a 15-year ramp-up period of increasing pension contributions so the State 
could adapt to the increased financial commitment.[120] At the end of that period 
in fiscal year 2010, the State’s contributions would remain at a level percentage of 
payrolls for thirty-five years until reaching 90% funding in fiscal year 
2045.[121] When the plan began in 1995, the State’s pension systems were 
significantly underfunded with almost $20 billion in unfunded liabilities and a 
funding ratio of 53%.[122] 
In its March 2013 Order, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), 
found that rather than “controlling the State’s growing pension burden,” the 1995 
plan by design “increased the unfunded liability, underfunded the State’s pension 
obligations, and deferred pension funding.”[123] “This resulting underfunding of 
the pension systems enabled the State to shift the burden associated with its 
pension costs to the future and, as a result, created significant financial stress and 
risks for the State.”[124] The SEC noted that unfunded liabilities grew because a 
majority of the State contributions required under the plan “were not sufficient to 
cover both (1) the cost of pension benefits earned by public employees by virtue of 
their service in the current year (“the normal cost”) and (2) a payment to amortize” 
past unfunded liabilities.[125] Indeed, in 2006, John Filan, as Director of 




Governor Blagojevich’s Office of Management and Budget, testified before a 
subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives that the 1995 plan was 
intended to underfund the pension systems and not pay normal costs and interest 
on the unfunded liability until 2034.[126] 
In addition, the SEC found that the General Assembly compounded this problem 
by enacting “Pension Holidays” lowering already deficient contribution amounts 
in 2006 and 2007, and not increasing contributions in 2008 through 2010 to offset 
these reductions.[127] The SEC observed that from 1996 to 2010 “the State’s 
unfunded liability increased by $57 billion” with insufficient State contributions as 
the “primary driver of this increase.”[128] This underfunding, the SEC noted, “also 
compromised the creditworthiness of the State and increases the State’s financing 
costs.”[129] Taken together, the SEC found that because of the State’s failure to 
adhere to the 1995 plan’s 15-year ramp period, “the State should have known that 
it likely would have significant difficulty making required contributions in the 
future.”[130] 
E.  The Lack of Proper Pension Funding Stems From A Flawed Fiscal 
System 
In 2009, the General Assembly’s Pension Modernization Task Force answered the 
important question of why proper pension funding was not forthcoming.[131] The 
Task Force found that: “[t]he State’s failure to make its required contributions to 
the five pension systems can be traced to one, simple cause: a State fiscal system 
that is so poorly designed that it failed for decades to generate enough revenue 
growth both to maintain service levels from one year to the next, and cover the 
State’s actuarially-required employer contribution to its five pension 
systems.”[132] The Task Force further found: 
This ongoing ‘structural deficit’ imposed a tough fiscal/political choice on State 
elected officials—fully fund pensions and cut services, or skip a portion of the 
pension payment and maintain as many services as possible.  Not wanting to 
implement cuts in spending on these services (or enact revenue increases), the 
legislature and various governors elected to instead divert revenue from making 
the required employer pension contribution to maintain services like education, 
healthcare, public safety and caring for disadvantaged populations.  Effectively, 
the State used the pension systems as a credit card to fund ongoing service 
operations.[133] 
Indeed, in June 2013, the Commission on Government Forecasting and 
Accountability (“COGFA”), testified before the First Conference Committee to 
Public Act 98-0599 and detailed the factors that caused the $87 billion growth in 
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unfunded pension liabilities between fiscal years 1985 and 2012.[134] COGFA’s 
analysis revealed that 47% of that growth (or $41.2 billion) came from the State 
not paying what it should have to the pension systems.[135] Stock market losses, 
the next single largest cause, accounted for 16.5% (or $14.4 billion) of that 
growth.[136] COGFA found that changes in actuarial assumptions, such as people 
living longer than expected, caused 10.1% (or $8.8 billion) of that 
growth.[137] Benefit increases for public employees only accounted for 9.3% (or 
$8.1 billion) of the growth.[138] And employee salary increases were less than 
expected over that period and actually helped reduce those unfunded liabilities by 
.6% (or $535 million).[139] 
In short, pension benefit increases and employee salary increases were not the 
main reasons why the State’s five pension systems are so underfunded.  Nor can 
the pension systems’ underfunding be blamed primarily on stock market losses or 
faulty assumptions that underestimated increased lifespans.  Rather, the problem 
stems primarily from the General Assembly’s failure to fund the system—a 
problem that was long-standing and well-known in 1970 and was the reason why 
the Pension Clause was adopted.[140] 
III.  THE SCOPE OF THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION’S PENSION 
CLAUSE 
The Pension Clause of the Illinois Constitution presents a serious legal obstacle to 
any efforts by the General Assembly to unilaterally alter the pension benefits of 
current employees and retirees.  The Clause provides that: “Membership in any 
pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school 
district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable 
contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or 
impaired.”[141] The Clause is based on and nearly identical to a provision found 
in the New York Constitution.[142] 
According to Illinois Supreme Court and Appellate Court decisions, the Pension 
Clause bars the General Assembly from unilaterally reducing the pension benefit 
rights of current employees as well as retirees.[143] The Pension Clause does this 
by safeguarding, as of when a person joins a public pension system, not only the 
benefit rights contained in the Illinois Pension Code,[144] but also all other 
benefits that are “limited to, conditioned on, and flow directly from membership 
in one of the State’s various public pension systems,” including subsidized health 
care.[145] The Clause’s protection also extends to employee contribution 
rates and any benefit increases added during an employee’s term of service.[146] 




As to funding, while the Clause does not require the State to fund the pension 
system at a specific funding percentage, it does mandate that pensions will be paid 
when they become due.[147] Put differently, the Clause is “aimed at protecting the 
right to receive the promised retirement benefits, not the adequacy of the funding 
to pay them.”[148] The Clause, according to the Illinois Supreme Court, “was 
intended to force the funding of pensions indirectly, by putting the state and 
municipal governments on notice that they are responsible for those benefits.” 
[149] The Clause also grants pension recipients a cause of action to compel the 
payment of benefits should a pension system default or be on the verge of 
default.”[150] 
Finally, while the Clause bars the General Assembly from unilaterally reducing 
pension benefit rights, these rights are “contractual” in nature.[151] Accordingly, 
pension benefit rights can be changed through contract modification principles if 
the legislature offers public employees legal consideration and public employees 
agree to accept that offer.[152] 
IV.  PROLOGUE: PUBLIC ACT 98-0599 AND ITS ORIGINS 
A.  Background 
During its 2013 Spring Session, two pension reform proposals were advanced in 
the General Assembly—Senate Bill 1 and Senate Bill 2404.  Senate Bill 1, as 
amended in the House of Representatives, was sponsored by House Speaker 
Michael Madigan,[153] while Senate Bill 2404 was sponsored by Senate President 
John Cullerton.[154] Both bills shared the objective of obtaining significant 
savings from the State pension systems by reducing the 3% compounded COLA 
rate that retirees and employees hired before January 1, 2011 receive under the 
Pension Code because that benefit represents the largest component of moneys 
paid out by the pension systems to retirees each year.[155] 
Each bill, however, took a different approach to achieve its savings against the 
backdrop of the Pension Clause.  The House proposal, which was set forth in 
several amendments to Senate Bill 1, sought to achieve savings through unilateral 
cuts to the pension benefits of retirees and current employees.  In the opinion of 
the Civic Federation of Chicago, the bill would not violate the Pension Clause 
because the legislature purportedly retained the power to cut pension benefits to 
address the State’s fiscal crisis, preserve the pension system, and protect the public 
welfare as detailed in the bill’s preamble.[156] The bill was endorsed by Illinois’ 
business community, including the Commercial Club of Chicago, and passed the 
House by a vote of 62-51-2, but failed to pass the Senate by a vote of 16-42-0.[157] 
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Senate Bill 2404, on the other hand, sought to achieve its savings by applying 
contract principles of offer, acceptance, and consideration through negotiations 
with public sector labor unions.[158] In exchange for agreeing to a lower COLA 
rate on their pensions, current employees and retirees were offered, among other 
things, a contractually-binding pension funding guarantee by the State, retiree 
healthcare access, and legal treatment of all future salary increases as pensionable 
income.[159] The bill sought to pass constitutional muster under the Pension 
Clause by using contract modification principles as indicated by Illinois court 
decisions.[160] Senate Bill 2404 was supported by public sector labor unions, 
passed the Senate by a vote of 40-16-0, but was never called for a vote in the 
House.[161] 
Since neither of these proposals passed both chambers in May 2013, a conference 
committee was formed in June 2013 under Senate and House Rules to resolve the 
differences between Public Act 98-0599 and Senate Bill 2404.  The 10-member 
bipartisan, bicameral committee, chaired by Senator Kwame Raoul, held three 
public hearings and other meetings throughout the summer and fall of 2013, and 
crafted a proposal. 
The goal of this proposal was to make benefit changes consistent with how 
California courts treat pension benefits—by cutting benefits while offsetting those 
cuts with other advantages.  The conference committee chose to follow this 
approach because it was different than the frameworks used by Senate Bill 1 and 
Senate Bill 2404.  Under the California approach, the legislation may unilaterally 
reduce pension benefits so long as the reductions are reasonable, bear some 
material relation to the fiscal integrity of the pension system, and provide affected 
participants with offsetting advantages.[162] The Democratic members of the 
conference committee offered a proposal in early September 2013, but Republican 
committee members opposed it as not providing sufficient savings and benefit 
reductions.[163] 
Due to that impasse, the four legislative leaders worked to bridge the gap in 
November 2013 and fashioned an agreed proposal.[164] The Leaders’ agreement 
was set forth as the First Conference Committee Report to Senate Bill 1 and used 
the House’s unilateral approach to achieve its goals rather than Senate Bill 2404’s 
contractual approach.[165] The proposal passed the General Assembly on 
December 3, 2013, and was signed into law as Public Act 98-0599 two days 
later.[166] The legality of this approach under the Pension Clause  is now pending 
in court. 




B.  SUMMARY OF PUBLIC ACT 98-0599’S PROVISIONS 
  Benefit Changes 
The Leaders’ Proposal, as set forth in Public Act 98-0599, makes six major changes 
to the pension benefits of current employees hired prior to January 1, 2011 and 
existing retirees as detailed below.  The pension systems’ actuaries estimate that 
because of the Act’s pension benefit reductions and new funding plan, the State 
will save over $145 billion over the next 30 years.[167] The Public Act is also 
estimated to reduce the pension systems’ existing $97.4 billion unfunded liability 
by $21 billion.[168] In addition, the Act is estimated to reduce the State’s fiscal 
year 2016 pension contribution by $1.2 billion.[169] 
Lower COLA Increases. Under Public Act 98-0599, the current 3% annual 
compounded COLA increase on pension income a participant receives is replaced 
by a formula that caps increases based on the participant’s years of 
service.[170] The formula is as follows: $1000 x years of service x 3% for 
participants not coordinated with Social Security;[171] and $800 x years of service 
x 3% for participants coordinated with Social Security.[172] The $1000 and $800 
figures contained in the formula are annually increased by inflation as determined 
by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics on a compounded 
basis.[173] If a participant’s pension income is less than $1000 or $800, as 
applicable, multiplied by years of service, then the participant will continue to 
receive the 3% compounded COLA increase. 
 Examples: A retired teacher participating in TRS who worked 30 years will receive 
a maximum $900 increase—$1000 x 30 x .03=$900.  A retired State agency 
employee participating in SERS who worked 30 years will receive a maximum 
$720 increase—$800 x 30 x .03=$720. 
The goal of the COLA rate change is to allow retirees with lower annual pensions 
and longer years of service to continue to receive the 3% compounded increases 
they would have received prior to Public Act 98-0599.  At the same time, the new 
COLA rate caps the increases for retirees with higher pension income amounts and 
for those who have fewer years of service. 
Skipped COLA Increases. In addition to lowering the COLA rate, Public Act 
98-0599 also skips (or withholds) a certain number of COLA increases after 
retirement at the new rate for current employees only based on their age as of June 
1, 2014.[174] The bill exempts retirees from this provision.  The skipped or 
withheld COLA increases begin in the participant’s second year in 
retirement.[175] COLA increases are also skipped or withheld on a staggered basis, 
not in back to back years as detailed below: 
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 Age 50 or older lose one increase (year two)[176] 
 Age 49 to 47 lose three increases (years two, four and six of retirement)[177] 
 Age 46 to 44 lose four increases (years two, four, six and eight of 
retirement)[178] 
 Age 43 and younger will lose five increases (years two, four, six, eight and ten 
of retirement)[179] 
 
Retirement Age Increase. Public Act 98-0599 increases the retirement age at 
which current employees who are age 45 or younger as of June 1, 2014 are eligible 
to receive a pension.[180] For each year an employee is younger than 46, the 
retirement age increases by 4 months, but no more than 5 years.[181] For example: 
A 40-year-old would need to work two additional years.[182] A 31-year-old would 
need to work an additional five years.[183] Public Act 98-0599 does not increase 
the retirement age for current employees who are age 46 or older as of June 1, 
2014.[184] 
Cap on Pensionable Salary. Public Act 98-0599 imposes a cap on the 
maximum salary used to determine a current employee’s pensionable income and, 
in turn, annual pension.[185] The cap is $110,631, but that amount is increased 
each year by the lesser of 3% or one half the rate of inflation as determined by U.S. 
Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics.[186] The salary cap provision, 
however, does not apply to annualized income exceeding the cap as of June 1, 2014, 
or salary based on an existing employment or collective bargaining 
agreement.[187] As a result, the salary of a current employee exceeding $110,631 
is grandfathered-in and remains pensionable income.[188] Any future salary 
increases that employee receives, however, would not be deemed pensionable 
income until the salary cap noted above increases and exceeds the employee’s 
salary level, unless the increases are built into an existing employment or collective 
bargaining agreement. 
Money Purchase Plan Changes. For TRS and SURS only, Public Act 98-0599 
modifies the formula used to determine a current employee’s base pension amount 
when he or she retires under what is known as the “money purchase” formula.  The 
“money purchase” formula is an alternative to the traditional benefit formula used 
to calculate an employee’s base pension amount for employees who began 
employment prior to July 1, 2005.[189] An employee is entitled to receive the 
highest base pension amount based on the two formulas.[190] 




For SURS participants, the money purchase formula produces the highest base 
pension amount the majority of the time.  TRS participants typically receive the 
highest base pension amount from the traditional benefit formula. 
The traditional benefit formula uses an employee’s final average salary amount, 
years of service, retirement age, and statutory accrual rate (e.g., 2.2% for each year 
of service).[191] For example, a current SURS employee with a final average salary 
of $52,500, who worked 25 years, and retired at age 67 would receive an annual 
base pension amount of $28,875 under a traditional formula.[192] 
The “money purchase” formula is a more complex calculation. [193] The formula 
takes the total employee contributions made to the pension system, multiplied by 
an interest rate known as the “effective rate of interest” or “regular interest rate” 
depending on the employee’s participation in SURS or TRS.[194] That total is 
multiplied by 2.4, which represents total employer contributions, and then divided 
by an actuarial factor established by the relevant pension system.[195] The higher 
the effective rate of interest, the greater the employee’s base annuity amount will 
be under the “money purchase” formula when he or she retires. 
In addition, an employee participating in SURS cannot receive a base pension 
amount greater than 80% of final average salary.[196] If the “money purchase” 
formula results in a base pension amount greater than 80% of final average salary, 
then the base pension amount is capped at 80% and the employee is entitled to 
receive a lump sum refund of any excess contributions made to the pension 
system.[197] 
Public Act 98-0599 alters the “money purchase” formula by statutorily-pegging the 
“effective rate interest” figure at the 30-year U.S. Treasury Bond rates plus .75%, 
which would be approximately 4.27%.[198] The effective rate of interest most 
recently used for the “money purchase” formula was 7.75%.  The consequences of 
Public Act 98-0599’s change are two-fold.  First, the “money purchase” formula 
will produce lower base pensions for SURS members who retire after June 30, 
2014.  Second, some SURS members upon retiring will not receive a lump sum 
refund of their excess contributions because their base pension amount will no 
longer exceed the 80% cap. 
1% Employee Contribution Rate Reduction. Public Act 98-0599 reduces by 
1% of salary the amount current employees must contribute to the pension 
system.[199] The contribution rate reduction specifically eliminates the 1% or 
0.5% of salary current employees contribute for purposes of funding the previous 
3% compounded COLA rate.[200] The contribution rate reduction was included 
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by the General Assembly as a form of “consideration” (or value given back) to 
employees for the COLA rate reduction and provide a legal defense to that 
reduction.[201] Whether the contribution rate reduction qualifies as legal 
consideration is a matter Illinois courts will decide in light of the preexisting duty 
rule.[202] 
  Additional Provisions 
In addition to making changes to pension benefits, Public Act 98-0599 contains 
several other provisions germane to the benefit changes.  First, the bill replaces the 
1995 funding plan with a new funding plan requiring each pension system to reach 
100% funding by fiscal year 2043, as opposed to the 90% funding target in fiscal 
year 2045.[203] 
Second, the bill includes a provision known as the “funding guarantee” whereby if 
the State Comptroller fails to make the State pension contribution required by law 
to a relevant State pension system, the relevant pension system board may file suit 
before the Illinois Supreme Court to order payment of the required contribution 
amount.[204] Unlike the “funding guarantee” provision contained in Senate Bill 
2404, the provision in Public Act 98-0599 lacks express language making the State 
“contractually obligated” to adhere to the new 100% funding schedule.[205] The 
General Assembly, accordingly, appears to retain the discretion to adjust the 
required contribution amounts that must be paid to the pension systems each 
year.[206] 
Third, Public Act 98-0599 redirects 10% of the savings obtained by the legislation 
as State contributions back into the pension systems rather than being money 
available in the state General Revenue Fund.[207] The bill further redirects $364 
million to be contributed into the State pension systems in fiscal year 2019 and $1 
billion in fiscal year 2020 and each year thereafter until the pension systems reach 
100% funding.[208] The additional contributions made beginning in fiscal year 
2019 represent money currently spent by the State to repay general obligation 
bonds that will be repaid in fiscal year 2019.  As with the “funding guarantee” 
provision, the General Assembly appears to retain the discretion to adjust the 
additional contribution amounts described above.[209] 
Fourth, Public Act 98-0599 creates an option for up to 5% of current employees to 
elect to participate in a voluntary, defined contribution plan offered by the affected 
State pension systems.[210] The terms of the plan would be established by each 
system.[211] 




Fifth, the legislation bars persons hired on or after June 1, 2014 by non-
governmental organizations, such as labor unions, lobbying groups and not-for-
profit entities, from participating in the public pension system.[212] The 
legislation also prohibits accumulated sick or vacation time from qualifying as 
pension service credit or pensionable income for employees hired on or after June 
1, 2014.[213] 
Finally, Public Act 98-0599 prohibits all pension changes made by the legislation, 
subsequent legislation, and the impacts and effects of implementing that 
legislation from being a mandatory subject of collective bargaining or interest 
arbitration.[214] The only exception to this prohibition is that public employers 
and employees may continue to bargain over the pick-up of employee 
contributions pursuant to Sections 14-133.1, 15-157.1, or 16-152.1 of the Illinois 
Pension Code.[215] 
V.  THE PENDING LEGAL CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC ACT 98-0599 
A.  Procedural History 
Not long after Public Act 98-0599 became law on December 5, 2013, five lawsuits 
were filed challenging the constitutionality of the legislation.[216] Taken together, 
the lawsuits were brought by: current and retired teachers participating in TRS; 
two retired State employee groups representing retired SERS, GARS, TRS, and 
SURS participants; a coalition of public sector labor unions known as “We Are 
One” representing current employees and retirees in SERS, SURS, and TRS; and 
the State Universities Annuitants Association (SUAA) representing current 
employees and retirees in SURS.[217] 
Because the lawsuits were filed in three different judicial circuits,[218] the Illinois 
Attorney General moved to consolidate the matters in the circuit court of Cook 
County where the first lawsuit was filed.[219] The Attorney General’s motion was 
opposed by three groups of plaintiffs who filed suit in the Seventh Judicial Circuit 
in Sangamon County and sought consolidation in that circuit.  Since the SUAA filed 
suit in the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Champaign County, SUAA sought to be separate 
from the other suits and proceed in that district.[220] Ultimately, the Illinois 
Supreme Court issued an order consolidating all five lawsuits before the circuit 
court of Seventh Judicial Circuit in Sangamon County.[221] As of this writing, the 
five lawsuits are pending before the Honorable John W. Belz who entered a 
preliminary injunction against Public Act 98-0599 on May 15, 2014.[222] 
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B.  Plaintiffs’ Legal Challenges To Public Act 98-0599 
Overall, the plaintiffs claim that Public Act 98-0599 violates three provisions of the 
Illinois Constitution: the Pension Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Takings 
Clause.  Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the reduction of the 3% compounded 
COLA rate, the COLA skips, the retirement age increase, the pensionable salary 
cap, and “money purchase” formula changes all violate these three provisions of 
the Illinois Constitution.  The Pension Clause claim is the main legal argument 
against Public Act 98-0599 with the Contract and Takings Clause claims pled as 
alternative legal theories as to why the legislation’s benefit changes improperly 
interfere with plaintiffs’ contract or property rights.  Through different individual 
plaintiffs, the lawsuits contend that the five pension benefits reductions made by 
Public Act 98-0599 “diminish or impair” their benefits in violations of the Pension 
Clause.  Interestingly, the “We Are One” and SUAA plaintiffs also assert a Taking 
Clause claim that the State’s failure to properly fund the State’s pension systems 
has resulted in a taking of private property.[223] The plaintiffs did not assert any 
federal law claims against Public Act 98-0599. 
In addition, the two State employee groups assert that the legislation violates the 
Illinois Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause by not applying the benefit 
reductions to current and retired judges.[224] These plaintiffs further claim that 
Public Act 98-0599’s COLA rate reduction violates the Contract Clause because the 
State purportedly made a contractual commitment through its 2002 early 
retirement incentive program whereby employees purchased service credit and the 
continued entitlement to the 3% compounded COLA rate in exchange for the State 
receiving lower personnel costs.[225] The Retired State Employees Association 
additionally claims that Senate Bill 1’s COLA rate reduction violates the Contract 
Clause because the State contractually bound itself to continue to offer a 3% COLA 
rate to SERS participants through statements made in SERS’ member handbooks 
between 1982 and 2011.[226] 
With respect to the 3% compounded COLA rate, the plaintiffs contend that Public 
Act 98-0599’s rate reduction will result in significantly smaller COLA increases in 
the future for the persons whose base pension amounts are subject to the new 
COLA rate.[227] The higher the base pension amount for these persons, plaintiffs 
assert, the greater their loss in future COLA increases when compared to the prior 
COLA rate.  The “We Are One” plaintiffs, for example, state in their complaint that 
the COLA rate reduction will reduce the future COLA payments to one retiree by 
almost $71,000 by the time he reaches age 85.[228] 




This loss in future COLA increases, according to the “We Are One” plaintiffs, has a 
compounded impact on current employees who are also subject to Public Act 98-
0599’s COLA skips provision, retirement age increase, and pensionable salary 
cap.[229] As another example, Public Act 98-0599 would purportedly reduce the 
pension benefits of one current employee by approximately $718,000 over the 
course of a 25 year retirement.[230] Public Act 98-0599’s 1% reduction in that 
employee’s contribution rate, however, would only result in that employee 
recouping $15, 613.[231] 
The SUAA complaint and its motion for a injunctive relief set forth the impact of 
Public Act 98-0599’s change to the “money purchase” formula.[232] SUAA states 
that by statutorily pegging the “effective rate interest” figure at 30-year U.S. 
Treasury Bond rates plus .75%, Public Act 98-0599 will have two adverse 
consequences for current employees in SURS.[233] First, the “money purchase” 
formula will produce a lower base pension amount than before the “effective rate 
of interest” change.[234] Second, for some employees in SURS, this change will 
result in a base pension amount less than 80% of final average salary, whereas 
before it would have exceeded that amount.[235] Accordingly, these employees 
will no longer receive at retirement a lump sum refund of any excess contributions 
they made to the pension system so their base pension amount would not exceed 
the 80% cap.[236] 
C.  The Illinois Attorney General’s Defense of Public Act 98-0599 
As of September 2014, the Illinois Attorney General has asserted essentially two 
defenses to uphold the constitutionality of Public Act 98-0599.  First, with respect 
to the COLA rate reduction and COLA skips provisions, the Illinois Attorney 
General contends that the 3% compounded COLA rate itself is “not part of the core 
pension benefit” protected by the Pension Clause.[237] 
The Illinois Attorney General states that the 3% compounded COLA rate was 
enacted in 1989 and awarded to retirees and dependents already receiving 
pensions and they had not made any contributions to the pension systems in 
exchange for the increase.[238] Also, the 3% compounded COLA rate was awarded 
to existing employees who merely continued to work after the increase was enacted 
without a corresponding increase in employee contributions.[239] The Illinois 
Attorney General further notes that the COLA rate has been increased by the 
legislature on several occasions, and the last time a COLA increase was coupled 
with an increase in employee contributions was in 1969 whereby employees 
contributed 0.5% of salary for a 1.5% simple annual increase on their base pension 
amount.[240] The Illinois Attorney General also points out that the 3% 
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compounded COLA rate has “in recent years substantially exceeded 
inflation.”[241] Public Act 98-0599’s COLA rate change, the Illinois Attorney 
General asserts, “was designed to have the least impact on members with the 
lowest salaries on which their pensions are calculated, on members who put in the 
most years of public service, and on members who retired before July 1, 
2014.”[242] 
Thus, the Illinois Attorney General appears to contend that the 3% compounded 
COLA (or any COLA increase) is not a protected “benefit” for Pension Clause 
purposes.[243] Similarly, the Illinois Attorney General appears to argue that even 
if it were a protected “benefit” under the Clause, persons already receiving 
pensions prior to when the 3% compound COLA increase become law in 1989 have 
no reasonable expectation to its continuation because they no longer worked for 
the State.[244] The same, under the Illinois Attorney General’s logic, would apply 
to persons who were current employees prior to 1989 who continued working for 
the State because they did not make increased contributions to the pension 
systems in exchange for the increase.[245] 
The Illinois Attorney General’s second defense of Public Act 98-0599 rests on the 
State’s so-called “police” or reserved powers.  In its answer and defenses to the 
complaints, the Illinois Attorney General asserts that Public Act 98-0599 is a 
“permissible exercise of the State of Illinois’ reserved sovereign powers (sometimes 
referred to as the State’s police powers).”[246] In support, the Illinois Attorney 
General contends that the underfunding in the State-funded retirement system 
contributed significantly to a severe financial crisis adversely affecting the long-
term financial soundness of those systems, the cost of financing the State’s 
operation and outstanding debt, and the State’s ability to provide critical services 
to Illinois residents.[247] The Illinois Attorney General further contends that the 
causes of this underfunding stemmed from “significant unforeseen and 
unanticipated events,” such as poor stock market returns by the pension systems, 
historically low inflation, significant increases in life expectancy, and other 
changes in actuarial assumptions.[248] 
These increased unfunded liabilities, the Illinois Attorney General argues, led to 
substantial reductions in the State’s revenues to contribute to the pension systems 
and to spend on salaries and other benefits for State employees.[249] The Illinois 
Attorney General further asserts that these unfunded liabilities have become 
unsustainable, have grown worse, and have created substantial uncertainty to the 
State’s business climate and ability  to produce tax revenues to support public 
services and fund the pension systems.[250] 




The Illinois Attorney General claims the General Assembly enacted Public Act 98-
0599 as a reasonable and necessary response to unanticipated exigencies to 
address the State’s financial crisis after already taking earlier action to reduce 
public spending, raise income taxes, defer State vendor payments, and enact a 
second tier of pension benefits for new hires in 2010.[251] For these reasons, the 
Illinois Attorney General argues that Public Act 98-0599 “represents a valid 
exercise of the State’s reserved sovereign powers to modify contractual rights and 
obligations, including contractual obligations of the State established under Article 
I, Section 16 and Article XII [sic], Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution.”[252] 
In late June 2014, the plaintiffs collectively responded to the Attorney General by 
moving for summary judgment to invalidate Public Act 98-0599 solely on their 
Pension Clause claims.[253] In that motion, the plaintiffs contend that the Pension 
Clause is not subject to a police power exception based on its plain language and 
drafting history as well as relevant Illinois court decisions.[254] At this point, 
however, the trial court judge has decided to postpone action on the plaintiffs’ 
motion and will allow the Attorney General to develop its defense by permitting 
fact and expert witnesses to be called.  To that end, the court established a 
discovery schedule extending into December 2014.[255] The trial court judge, at 
that point, appeared inclined to have the parties prepare a detailed factual record 
before ruling on each of the plaintiffs’ claims and the Attorney General’s 
defenses.  As this Article went to press, however, the trial court judge entered an 
order staying discovery and expressed interest in deciding the case by the end of 
this calendar year.[256] 
VI.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
As of September 2014, the Illinois Attorney General has not set forth the specific 
legal authority supporting her claim that the State’s so-called police or reserved 
powers allowed the General Assembly to make the unilateral pension benefit cuts 
provided in Public Act 98-0599 without violating the Pension Clause.  Illinois’ 
business community, however, through the Commercial Club of Chicago and its 
law firm, Sidley Austin, previously articulated such an argument in April 2011 in 
response to an earlier article that this author wrote that comprehensively reviewed 
the origins, background, and scope of the Pension Clause.[257] 
Sidley argued that because paying 100% of all pension benefits will “crowd out 
expenditures on health, education, and public safety” under current revenue 
assumptions, the State can trump is obligations under the Pension Clause and 
divert funds to fund government services the General Assembly deems 
essential.[258] Sidley rested this conclusion on the claim that “no constitutional 
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rights are absolute,” its reading of the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Felt v. 
Board of Trustees of the Judges Retirement Systems, and its view that the Pension 
Clause provides no better protection than the Contract Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.[259] While Sidley’s police powers argument is fatally flawed for 
several reasons articulated by this author elsewhere, only one need be discussed 
here.[260] 
The police powers argument cannot be squared with the Pension Clause’s plain 
language which admits of no exceptions.  Nor is that argument supported by the 
Pension Clause’s drafting history, Convention debates, and voters’ understanding 
of the Clause.[261] Indeed, the drafters did not accept the proposal made by 
Delegate Wayne Whalen, an opponent of the Pension Clause, to expressly amend 
the Illinois Constitution’s Contract Clause to protect public pensions or his view 
that the Pension Clause provided no better protection than the Contract 
Clause.[262] 
Instead, the delegates adopted an independent provision modeled after the one 
found in the New York Constitution to ensure “the vested rights of pension plan 
participants not be defeated or diminished.”[263] The Illinois Supreme Court has 
explained that the framers added the Clause to give public employees “a basic 
protection against abolishing their rights completely or changing the terms of their 
rights after they have embarked upon the employment—to lessen them.”[264] The 
Clause, as the Court recently observed, was intended “to guarantee that retirement 
rights enjoyed by public employees would be afforded contractual status and 
insulated from diminishment and impairment by the General Assembly.”[265] In 
addition, the notion that the Pension Clause is subject to a police powers exception 
has already been rejected by Illinois courts on two occasions.[266] 
Moreover, if the drafters intended to subject the Pension Clause to a police powers 
exception, then they certainly knew how to accomplish that result as they did with 
the individual constitutional right to bear arms found in Article I, Section 22 of the 
Illinois Constitution.[267] As the Illinois Supreme Court recently concluded, “[w]e 
may not rewrite the pension protection clause to include restrictions and 
limitations that the drafters did not express and the citizens of the Illinois did not 
approve.”[268] Accordingly, the State’s police power is not superior to the Pension 
Clause; rather it yields to the Clause, just as it yields to other specific constitutional 
prohibitions and positive mandates.[269] 
Also, the Pension Clause cannot be equated with the Bill of Rights to the U.S. 
Constitution as inherently containing or being subject to exceptions based on 
notions of necessity.  As the U.S. Supreme Court explained long ago, it is “well-




settled” that the Bill of Rights was “not intended to lay down any novel principles 
of government, but simply certain guaranties and immunities which were inherited 
from our English ancestors, and which had, from time immemorial, been subject 
to certain well-recognized exceptions, arising from the necessities of the 
case.”[270] 
The Pension Clause, in contrast, does not have such a history or intent to 
accommodate exceptions based on claims of necessity.  As noted above, Delegate 
Green stated during the Convention that one of the purposes of the Clause was to 
bar the State from relying on the consequences of its failure to properly fund the 
pension system as a basis for cutting or repudiating it pension obligations as was 
the case in New Jersey in 1964.[271] 
Simply put, the Pension Clause constitutes what the U.S. Supreme Court described 
in its Blaisdell decision as a constitutional restriction that is specific and “so 
particularized as to not admit of construction” based on its language and 
history.[272] In Blaisdell, the Supreme Court implied a police power exception to 
the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution based on that clause’s “general 
language,” unhelpful legislative history, and the fact that the Tenth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution reserves police power to the States.[273] None of these 
features, which were dispositive in Blaisdell about the Contract Clause, apply to 
the Pension Clause. 
After all, what constitutes a “contract” or “impairment” for Contract Clause 
purposes is strictly a question of federal, not state law.[274] As the Illinois 
Supreme Court has explained, “[t]his court’s jurisprudence of state constitutional 
law cannot be predicated on trends in legal scholarship, the actions of our sister 
states, a desire to bring about change in the law, or a sense of deference to the 
nation’s highest court.”[275] “Rather, our choice of a rule of decision on matters 
governed by both the state and federal constitutions has always been and must 
continue to be predicated on our best assessment of the intent of the drafters, the 
delegates, and the voters—this is out solemn obligation.”[276] As a result, the 
likelihood of a police power defense succeeding to vindicate Public Act 98-0599 
should be at best an extremely remote outcome, especially because of the Clause’s 
plain language, drafting history, and purpose, and because of Illinois’ long-
standing and conscious failure to properly fund the pension systems as discussed 
above. 
With that said, the Illinois Attorney General’s position that the 3% compounded 
COLA rate is not a protected “benefit” under the Pension Clause for persons who 
were already retired and receiving pensions prior to that rate increase becoming 
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law in August 1989 has merit.  The Illinois Appellate Court has long held that a 
member of pension system who did not continue working or make contributions 
to the pension system after the legislature enacted a benefit increase is not entitled 
to that benefit increase under the Clause.[277] These decisions explain that 
allowing a member to receive the benefit increase would be tantamount to “an 
unconstitutional expenditure of public funds for a private purpose” in violation of 
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Illinois Constitution.[278] Whether the Illinois 
Supreme Court will reach the same conclusion remains to be seen. 
Finally, the claim that the 3% compounded COLA is not a protected “benefit” under 
the Pension Clause cannot withstand scrutiny for employees who joined the 
pension system or continued working for the State after the Pension Code 
provision took effect in 1989.  During the Convention debates, the sponsors of the 
Pension Clause refuted the opponents’ claim that the Clause required inflationary 
protection of benefits.[279] Those statements, however, do not support the 
conclusion that a Pension Code provision that automatically increases a member’s 
base pension amount during retirement lacks Pension Clause protection.  As 
Delegate Henry Green stated in response to the opponents, “any of you know when 
you buy an insurance policy you’re going to get what the contract says.  Now if the 
dollar isn’t worth but 27 cents when you get it back, there is absolutely no reason 
why you have any recourse against the insurance company.”[280] Delegate Kinney 
also explained that “an increase in benefits would not be precluded” by the Clause 
and that the legislature could tie pension benefits to automatic cost of living 
increases.[281] 
Indeed, as the Illinois Supreme Court recently determined, the Pension Clause’s 
plain language protects all benefits that are “limited to, conditioned on, and flow 
directly from membership in one of the State’s various public pension systems” 
whether found in the Pension Code or in other state statutes.[282] The Clause 
further protects benefit increases later enacted so long as the person continues 
working or contributing to the pension system after the increase takes 
effect.[283] As a result, it is hard to fathom how the 3% compounded COLA rate 
increase provision found in the Pension Code would not qualify as a protected 
benefit for those plaintiffs who either joined the pension system or continued 
working for the State after that Pension Code provision took effect in 1989. 
In closing, Public Act 98-0599 is not the first instance where the State has 
attempted to trump the plain language and purpose of a specific provision of the 
Illinois Constitution under the banner of fiscal necessity.  In 1863, the Illinois 
Supreme Court, in the midst of the Civil War, considered the constitutionality of 
legislation passed in 1861 that swept and diverted moneys from a special property 




tax and fund established by Article XV of the 1848 Illinois 
Constitution.[284] Article XV was separately approved by Illinois voters[285] for 
the purpose of retiring the “almost insurmountable”[286] debts the State had 
incurred during the 1830s and 1840s to finance internal improvement projects, 
such as the construction of railroads and improved modes of river 
transportation.[287] 
The preamble of the 1861 legislation declared that while the State’s financial 
condition required more revenue, the State’s “prosperity” “imperatively 
demand[ed]” that such revenue not come from taxation, “but on the contrary, if 
possible, by diminishing [the State’s] present heavy rate of taxation.”[288] To that 
end, the legislation ordered the State Auditor to sweep the moneys in Article XV’s 
special fund and also divert the proceeds of the special property tax for deposit into 
the general revenue fund for expenditure on other purposes.[289] In defending the 
legislation, the State Auditor claimed without dispute that if the diverted moneys 
had to be restored to Article XV’s special fund to repay bondholders, then the State 
Treasury would be “bankrupt” and the State would not be able to pay its ordinary 
expenses.[290] 
The Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the 1861 legislation as violative of Article 
XV’s plain language and purpose, and ordered the restoration of the diverted 
funds.[291] The Court bluntly explained that “however praiseworthy” was the 
legislature’s desire “to relieve the people from a heavy, and apparently, an 
unnecessary tax” the “injunction of the constitution should be considered above 
them all.”[292] The Court continued that “[p]rivate distress, great financial 
embarrassments, even public calamity, are held, by a just people, as airy nothings, 
when weighed against the high behests of the constitution.”[293] Emphatically, 
the Court stated: 
Let it not be said, however great disasters may befall us, however much we may be 
impoverished, how heavy the burden imposed upon us may be, we will, for relief, destroy the 
constitution, or disregard its requirements.  Our safety, in the midst of perils, is in a strict 
observance of the constitution—this is the bulwark to shield us from aggressions.  Trifling with 
it, treating it lightly, dispensing with this or that provision of it, is the sure precursor of the 
direst calamity which can befall the people, the end of which cannot fail to be, anarchy and 
ruin.”[294] 
Moreover, in response to the State Auditor’s claim that the State Treasury lacked 
adequate funds to pay ordinary State government expenses without the diverted 
moneys, the Court stated that the General Assembly was “composed of high 
minded, and patriotic, and just men, clothed with ample powers to provide for all 
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financial difficulties” and that they would “promptly” come up with a way to rescue 
the State.”[295] 
In sum, if this State’s law and history is at all dispositive, then Public Act 98-0599 
will most likely suffer a fate similar to the 1861 law.  For this outcome to have 
lasting significance, however, will require the public’s acceptance of the obligations 
and boundaries imposed by the Pension Clause, and the public’s rejection of the 
mindset that “history is more or less bunk…and the only history that is worth a 
tinker’s damn is the history we make today.”[296] 
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required in the future.”); id. at 43-44 (“The pension funds financed by State 
appropriations are likewise restricted to certain limited revenues which do not take 
into account the currently accruing pension cost for current service or the 
unfunded accrued liability for previous service.”); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1961, at 31-32 (same); REPORT OF THE 
ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1963, at 25-26 (same). 
[29] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1961, 
at 32; see also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS 
COMMISSION OF 1963, at 25-26; REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION 
LAWS COMMISSION OF 1969, at 106. 
[30] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1961, 
at 72; see also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS 
COMMISSION OF 1969, at 39). 
[31] See REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION 
OF 1947, at 28-29, 46-48 (1945) (discussing the Commission’s recommendation to 
budget and fund pension costs when incurred and funding on an actuarially 
required basis); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS 
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COMMISSION OF 1949, at 8, 17, 31-38, 73-75 (same and stating that pension 
underfunding “is a problem which will no longer respond to half-way measures of 
treatment.  Corrective measures embodying approved and realistic pension 
principles are imperative.”); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION 
LAWS COMMISSION OF 1951, at 11, 21-22, 39-41 (same); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1953, at 7, 30-32; 112-13 
(same); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION 
OF 1955, at a-b, 15, 26-27, 54-55 (same) id. at 15 (recommending that pension be 
funded under a “current plus interest” method whereby contributions equals 
“current service requirements and an amount which shall at least be equal to the 
interest on the unfunded accrued liability; stating at 26 as to state pension funds 
that: “Instead of biennial appropriations in lump sum amounts to the pension 
system, each departmental or agency appropriation for personal services should 
be sufficient to include the pension costs incident to that appropriation.  Upon 
payment of salary to the employee, the corresponding pension cost could be paid 
to the pension fund.”); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS 
COMMISSION OF 1957, at 7-8, 11, 15-21, 23-29,75-80  (same); id. at 8 (“States of a 
comparable economic position [as Illinois], especially those adjoining Illinois, all 
subscribe to the accrual principle of financing of pension obligations. Illinois 
remains the exception.”); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS 
COMMISSION OF 1959, at 8, 14, 30-31, 43-49 (same); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1961, at 11, 18, 23-24, 31, 44-49 
(same); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION 
OF 1963, at 13-14, 25-32,  (same); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1965, at 14, 37-46 (same); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1967, at 9, 12, 45-52; id at 9 
(noting that the recommendation “received acceptance at the State 
level.”); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION 
OF 1969, at 11, 14-15, 57-65 (same). 
[32] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1957, 
at 76; REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION 
OF 1965, at 39  (same). 
[33] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1965, 
at 10; REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION 
OF 1971, at 10 (1971) (same); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION 
LAWS COMMISSION OF 1975-1977, at 15 (1977) (same); see also REPORT OF THE 
ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1979-80, at 13 (stating 
that the “method of current budgeting of the accruing pension cost as has been 




advocated by the Commission by integrating such costs with the personnel budget 
has not as yet received full acceptance among the various public agencies.”). 
[34] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION of 1965, 
at 41. 
[35] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1957, 
at 8; see also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION 
OF 1965, at 10 (“What is of primary concern to the Commission and imperatively 
required is a financial policy on the part of both the State of Illinois and the local 
governments which will produce adequate revenues for the financial needs of these 
funds on a basis that will permit financial progress and the development of the 
pension funds consistent with recognized principles for financing pensions.”). 
[36] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1965, 
at 46; REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION 
OF 1979-80, at 52 (same). 
[37] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION Of 1965, 
at 46. 
[37] See REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION 
OF 1947, at 48, 57-59 (briefly discussing how  pensions are treated under Illinois 
law and case law developments); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1951, at 82-91 (analyzing the legal status of pension 
rights under Illinois law); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS 
COMMISSION OF 1953, at 94-104 (detailing the legal protections afforded to pension 
benefits deemed protected under a contractual theory); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1961, at 71  (explaining the nature 
of gratuity plans); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS 
COMMISSION OF 1965, at 103-07 (discussing whether pension benefits were 
protected as vested or contractual rights, noting that “number of courts adopting 
the view that such pensions are in the nature of contractual or vested rights,” and 
referring to this trend as “disturbing” because of the limits this theory could place 
on the ability legislature to alter or amend benefit rights). 
[39] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION Of 1961, 
at 71. 
[40] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1969, 
at 32. 
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[41] Id. 
[42] COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT FORECASTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY, FINANCIAL 
CONDITION OF THE ILLINOIS STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM as of June 30, 2013, at 27 
(Mar. 2014) available at:http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/FinCondILStateRetireme 
ntSysFY13Mar2014.pdf. 
[43] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1969, 
at 42. 
[44] Id. at 32. 
[45] See Madiar Pension Article, supra note 2, at 7-40 (for a detailed discussion of 
the background, purposes, and scope of the Pension Clause); ROBERT TILOVE, 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION FUNDS 337 (1976) (reviewing public pensions generally, 
focusing on New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois specifically and finding with 
respect to the Illinois Constitution’s Pension Clause: “This provision, written by a 
constitutional convention, was copied almost verbatim from New York’s 
constitution of 1938.  Supported by organized labor and other employee groups 
and by some system trustees and administrators, the clause was opposed by the 
Pension Laws Commission, which argued that it was too rigid, would inhibit 
change, and would preclude correction of errors or equitable adjustments in rates 
of contribution, eligibility conditions, and the like.  There was a major argument in 
favor of the clause: the failure of the state and its municipalities to fund the systems 
adequately.  The danger of benefit cuts because of fiscal pressure seemed like a real 
possibility at the time.”); Bob Sector & Rick Pearson, Pension Crisis Rooted in 1970 
Debate, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 2013, available at: http://articles.chicagotribune. 
com/2013-09-22/news/ct-met-public-pensions-1970-20130923_1_pension-clau 
se-pension-debate-constitutional-convention (reviewing the 1970 Constitutional 
Convention debates of the Pension Clause and concluding that both its backers and 
critics agreed the provision “was aimed at providing an ironclad guarantee to 
public workers that their pension benefits, once promised could not be trimmed” 
and the Clause was prompted by “a chronic failure by lawmakers to pay enough 
money into the funds to cover projected pension costs and keep them financially 
sound.”).  Cf. Elk Grove Engineering Co. v. Korzen, 55 Ill.2d 393, 399-400, 304 
N.E.2d 65, 69 (1973) (“The framers of the constitution would naturally examine 
the state of things at the time; and their work sufficiently attests that they did so.”). 
[46] Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811 at ¶45 quoting IV Proceedings, Sixth Ill. 
Constitutional Convention 2930-31 (1970) (statements of Delegate Bottino) 
[hereinafter IV Proceedings]. 




[47] IV Proceedings, supra note 46, at 2931(1970) (remarks of Delegate Green). 
[48] Id. (referring to Spina v. Consolidated Police and Firemen’s Fund Comm’n, 
41 N.J. 391, 396, 402-04, 197 A.2d 169, 171, 176-76 (N.J. 1964)). 
[49] Id. at 2931; see also id. at 2930 (remarks of Delegate Bottino) (“[P]articipants 
in these pension systems have been leery for years of the fact that—this matter of 
the amount the state has appropriated has been made a political football, in a 
sense.  In other words, in order to balance budgets, you see, the party in power 
would just use the amount of the state contribution to help balance budgets, and 
this had gotten to the point where many of the so-called pensioners under this 
system were very concerned; and I think this is the reason that pressure is 
constantly being placed on the legislature to at least put in a fair amount of state 
resources into guaranteeing payment of pensions.”). 
[50] Id. at 2931.  See Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, at ¶46 (quoting Delegate 
Green’s Convention statements as establishing that the Clause was intended “to 
protect ‘public employees who are beginning to lost faith in the ability of the state 
and its political subdivisions to meet these benefit payments’ and to address the 
‘insecurity on the part of the public employees [which] is really defeating the very 
purpose for which the retirement system was established.”) (quoting IV 
Proceedings 2925). Id. at ¶46 (quoting remarks of Delegate Kemp, a supporter of 
the Clause, who “viewed its purpose as ‘mak[ing] certain that irrespective of the 
financial condition of a municipality or even the state government, that those 
persons who have worked for often substandard wages over a long period of time 
could at least expect to live in some kind of dignity during their golden years.”) 
(quoting IV Proceedings 2926). 
[51] Legislative Commission Reorganization Act of 1984, Public Act 83-1257 (Ill. 
1984). 
[52] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1971, 
at 9; see also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION 
OF 1973, at 69 (1973) (noting that increased unfunded liabilities “cannot be 
attributed to low rates of employee contributions.”); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1975-1977, at 67 (stating that the failure 
to meet statutory funding policies for the state pension systems “is largely, though 
not exclusively, responsible for the increasing level of unfunded liabilities.  A 
contributory retirement plan depends upon three critical sources of 
revenue.  These are (1) employee contributions, (2) employer contributions, and 
(3) income derived from the investment of the employer and employee 
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contributions.  The employees have met their obligations since the inception of the 
system.  The State has failed substantially to meet its share of the cost.”); REPORT 
OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1979-1980, at 48 
(same); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION 
OF 1981-1983, at 10, 39 (1983) (same). 
[53] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION of 1971, 
at 9. 
[54] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1979-
1980, at 66. 
[55] Id. 
[56] Id. at 66-67. 
[57] Id. 
[58] Id. at 67. 
[59] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1971, 
at 29-36; REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION 
OF 1973, at 17-18, 20-24, 27-30, 65-73; ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS 
COMMISSION, MAJOR POLICY JUDGMENTS, at 1 (Mar. 9, 1976) (“Pension costs should 
be budgeted currently as a part of the personnel service expense of each 
department or agency of government, thus expressing this cost equitably on a 
functional basis.  The normal cost rate should be expressed as as a percentage of 
payroll to be applied annually by each department or agency against the amount 
requested for personal services.  An addition to the rate should be provided to 
cover the interest accrual on the unfunded pension liability, thus stabilizing such 
liability at its current level.  This procedure would meet satisfactorily technical 
requirements for funding pension liabilities for public pension funds.”); REPORT OF 
THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1975-1977, at 10, 14, 
17-18, 23-25, 49-51, 56-60, 61-68; REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1979-80, at 9, 37-38, 46-52, 85-87; REPORT OF THE 
ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1981-83, at 29-44 (1983) 
(same). 
[60] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1981-
83, at 31-33 (1983). 
[61] Id. at 33. 





[63] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1973, 
at 8. 
[64] Id. 
[65] Id. at 23-24. 
[66] Id.; see also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS 
COMMISSION OF 1971, at 65-69 (discussing the Commission’s failed attempts to 
modify the Pension Clause during the Constitutional Convention, the implications 
of the Clause, and limits the Clause would have on the ability of the General 
Assembly to unilaterally change pension benefits); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1975-1977, at 77-82) (1977) (discussing 
the scope of the Pension Clause in light of court decisions from New York). 
[67] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1973, 
at 13 (“As a means of alleviating the fiscal problems of government, a proposal has 
recently been advanced by economists and educators to fund the public employee 
retirement systems on a strict payout basis and thus dispense with the need for 
accumulated reserves.  This method has been advanced as a means of ‘reducing’ 
public expenditures.  An ‘owe-as-you-go-’ or strict ‘payout’ funding basis is 
unacceptable since it results in a deferment of the burden of financing currently 
incurred benefit obligations to future generations of taxpayers.  The Commission’s 
unequivocal conclusion is that instead of reducing cost requirements for pensions, 
it will result in appreciably greater costs to government.”); id. at  65-73 (further 
discussion of the current funding policy and proper alternatives); REPORT OF THE 
ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1975-1977, at 49-51, 61-
68; ILLINOIS ECONOMIC AND FISCAL COMMISSION, PENSION OVERVIEW: February 
1988, at 2 (1988) (identifying FY 1973 as the first year of the “payout” funding 
policy). 
[68] TAXPAYERS’ FEDERATION OF ILLINOIS, ILLINOIS STATE SPENDING: THE THOMSON 
YEARS, 1978-88, at 90 (1988) [hereinafter Taxpayers’ Report]. 
[69] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1973, 
at X; REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION 
OF 1979-80, at 38 (“In the case of State-financed pension plans, arbitrary 
appropriations unrelated to actual requirements result only in a deferment of the 
pension obligations.  Considerably larger allocations to the pension plans will be 
required in the future.”). 
SUMMER 2014 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT 45 
 
[70] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1975-
1977, at 62-64; see also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS 
COMMISSION OF 1979-80, at 46-52 (examining the payout method and expected 
sharp increase in benefit payments in future years as well as the need to adopt an 
actuarially-sound funding policy). 
[71] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1975-
1977, at 64. 
[72] Id.; see also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS 
COMMISSION OF 1981-1983, at 30 (“Proponents of ‘pay-as-you-go’ funding argue 
that in the case of public retirement systems, the unlimited taxing power of 
government provides sufficient guarantee that benefits will be paid.  But there is a 
distinct possibility that if future pension requirements become too burdensome, 
and adequate pension assets do not exist, pension benefits will be reduced by 
legislative action or a new, less liberal retirement plan will be instituted for new 
employees.”). 
[73] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1975-
1977, at  64-65; see also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS 
COMMISSION OF 1979-1980, at 13, 43 (same). 
[74] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1975-
1977, at 65. 
[75] NOEL EBRAHIM ET AL., OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, A REPORT ON THE PUBLIC 
PENSION SYSTEMS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (1979). 
[76] Id. at 1 (Mercer Recommendations) (“Unfunded liabilities are projected to 
grow at an alarming rate.  It is urgent for the state of Illinois to establish a funding 
program which will, at a minimum, stabilize the unfunded liabilities of the various 
state and local systems.  The three major state benefit retirement systems, though 
solvent and making payments today, will not be able to meet future commitments 
because of the growth of the unfunded portion of the plans. It is doubtful that taxes 
will be able to keep pace with benefits and payout schedules.  Because these funds 
face enormous future unfunded liabilities, it is quite possible that the bond rating 
of the state will be negatively affected.  The Pension Laws Commission has held 
consistently to the recommendation of paying current costs plus interest on 
unfunded liability.  Its effect has been to stabilize the present unfunded amounts 
to preclude growth of this liability.  We agree and support this 
recommendation.  Because a major commitment to establishing the unfunded 
liabilities of the systems would create a serious budgetary crisis if implemented 




immediately, we recommend that the rational approach toward funding this 
liability is the ‘grade in’ program.  This approach envisions slowly grading in year 
by year, to the stabilized level of funding consistent with the guidelines of the 
Pension Laws Commission.”). 
[77] Id. at 3. 
[78] Id. at 8-11; id. at 1 (Mercer Recommendations). 
[79] ILLINOIS ECONOMIC AND FISCAL COMMISSION, PENSION OVERVIEW: February 
1988, at 2 (Feb. 1988). 
[80] JUDY BAAR TOPINKA, FISCAL FOCUS, ILLINOIS STATE PENSION SYSTEMS: A 
CHALLENGING POSITION 3 (May 2011) [hereinafter TOPINKA REPORT] available 
at: http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/resources/fiscal-focus/may-2011-illin 
ois-state-pension-systems-a-challenging-position/; TAXPAYERS 
REPORT, supra note 68, at 90. 
[81] See ILLINOIS STUDY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC PENSION INVESTMENT POLICIES, 
FINAL REPORT 8 (Mar. 1982) (stating “net investment income recorded the sharpest 
advance in the FY76-FY81 period, increasing more than 2 ½ times from $141.4 
million to approximately $397.6 million.  As a consequence, investment income 
accounts for a larger proportion of the [three funding sources] than it did five years 
ago: 35% rather than 24%.”). 
[82] GOVERNOR’S RETIREMENT SYSTEM TASK FORCE REPORT, December 1985, at 28 
(1985). 
[83] See TAXPAYERS REPORT, supra note 68, at 91; ILLINOIS STUDY COMMISSION ON 
PUBLIC PENSION INVESTMENT POLICIES, FINAL REPORT 8 (Mar. 1982) (noting the 
state’s adherence to the 100% payout policy, but the departure from that policy in 
FY 1982 as a “budget savings measure”); State of Illinois, File No. 3-15237, Release 
No. 9389 at 3 (S.E.C. Mar. 13, 2013), available at: http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
admin/2013/33-9389.pdf [hereinafter “SEC Order”]; Jennifer Halperin, Pension 
Deficit Haunts Future:  State Government Is Biggest Employer In Illinois, But 
The State Is Years Behind in Funding Its Pension System,, ILLINOIS ISSUES, July 
1993, at 18, available at: http://www.lib.niu.edu/1993/ii930717.html (“One habit 
consistently pointed out as devastating to the pension funds began in 1982, when 
the state stopped contributing enough money to the funds to cover checks going 
out in the same year. The stock market was doing well, so pension funds’ 
investment income was up. In response, former Governor James R. Thompson 
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reduced state contributions to less than two-thirds of the 1982 payout to 
retirees. That practice was supposed to be limited to one year but was not.”). 
[84] TAXPAYERS REPORT, supra note 68, at 91; TOPINKA REPORT, supra note 80, at 
4. 
[85] TAXPAYERS REPORT, supra note 68, at 91-94; TOPINKA REPORT, supra note 80 
at 4; Dawn Clark Netsch, Testimony Before the Joint Hearing of the Select 
Committee on Aging and the Joint Economic Committee’s Subcommittee on 
Investment: Using Public Employee Pensions to Balance State and Local Budgets: 
The Impact on Public Employees, Retirees, and Taxpayers 22 (Nov. 20, 1991) (“The 
basic problem is that the systems are not and have not been funded on an actuarial 
basis.  From FY 1973 through FY 1981, the State contribution was set equal to 100% 
of benefit payout, on the assumption that both employee contributions and 
investment would be invested to provide for future benefits.  When Illinois went 
into the recession in the early 1980s, one of the casualties was the State’s pension 
contributions.  In FY 1982, the aggregate contribution to the five systems was 
reduced to the equivalent of 62.5% of payout, one month’s school, aid payments 
were delayed, over $60 million was ‘borrowed’ from other State funds, and $150 
million was borrowed in the credit markets.  For FY 1983, the Governor proposed 
a five-year phased-in return to 100% of payout and proposed a contribution equal 
to 70% of payout, but only 51% of payout was enacted.  For FY 1984, the Governor 
proposed 77.5% of payout, but only 60% of payout was enacted and that became 
Illinois ‘funding policy’ through FY 1987.  For FY 1988, the Governor proposed a 
$1 billion tax increase, but no increase in pension contributions over the prior 
year.  When the legislature refused to pass the tax increase, he cut agency budgets 
across the board and took additional cuts out of the pension contribution, for a 
total reduction of over $60 million.  The cuts were justified by claiming that the 
State “should share in the retirement systems’ above average investment 
returns.” Two months later the stock market fell by over 500 points and the 
systems ended the year with investment returns of 2.5% or less.  The resulting 
appropriation was the equivalent of 44% of payout, and a ‘new’ funding policy was 
implemented—at least for one more year.”) 
[86] TOPINKA REPORT, supra note 80, at 4. 
[87] ILLINOIS ECONOMIC AND FISCAL COMMISSION, PENSION OVERVIEW 20-22 & Tbl. 8 
(1990) (“For the State systems, there is no relationship between contributions 
required under normal cost plus interest and actual employer contributions. [T]he 
employer contribution has fallen far short of the employer’s normal cost plus 
interest between FY 1984 and FY 1989.  Over that period State contributions have 




been related to benefit payout rather than the actuarial cost of benefits earned.  The 
percentage of the required contribution that has been covered by the State has 
varied considerably.  The contribution for TRS began at 50% in FY 1984, rose to 
over 60%, and then dropped below 50% for FY 1989.  The percentage for SERS 
also improved and then dropped, while the SURS percentage increased slightly 
over the period and then decline.  The covered percentages for JRS and GARS also 
fluctuated.  The system considered to be the healthiest of the State systems (SERS0 
had about two-thirds of the contribution covered for FY 1989.  The largest system, 
TRS, had less than half of the contribution covered in FY 1989, and about one- 
third was covered for SURS.  Even thought the TRS and SURS are currently in 
similar financial condition and have been receiving State contributions based on 
similar percentages of payout, the implications of continuing recent employer 
funding practices are more serious for SURS due to the size of the system and the 
particularly significant shortfalls between actual employer contributions and those 
required under normal cost plus interest.”). 
[88] TOPINKA REPORT, supra note 80, at 4. 
[89] Bob Sector, Pension Mess Now All The Rage In Springfield, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 
30, 2012, available at: 2012 WLNR 28162974. 
[90] Id. 
[91] Public Act 82-960 (Ill. 1982); TAXPAYERS REPORT, supra note 68, at 
93; ILLINOIS TAX FOUNDATION, TWO DECADES OF ILLINOIS STATE SPENDING: 1972-
1992, at 81 (1992) (“In FY72, employee contributions were the systems’ main 
income source, providing more than one-half of the state retirement systems’ total 
income. State appropriations provided roughly one-third of the total at that time 
and investment income represented only 14 percent of the total income for these 
systems.  By FY75, state appropriations had become the primary income source 
and remained so for six consecutive years (through FY81).  . . .  Investment income 
became the retirement systems’ principal income source beginning in the recession 
year of FY82 and it remained so through FY91.  Through most of the ‘80s, state 
appropriations declined as a percentage of system’s income, and from FY88-FY91 
state retirement appropriations for the first time provided less cash for the 
retirement systems than was provided by employee payroll contributions.”) 
(emphasis added). 
[92] See ILLINOIS STUDY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC PENSION INVESTMENT POLICIES, 
FINAL REPORT, at 8, 44-47 (1982) (explaining that the investment authority of each 
state pension fund is subject to specific statutory restrictions); id. at 10 (stating 
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that the investment returns of the five state pension funds “have not kept pace with 
inflation.  The funds have also lagged behind other indicators of institutional 
investments.  Over the last five years, the Standard & Poor 500 Index has had an 
annualized rate of return of 10.1%.  The entire universe of public and private 
retirement funds had an average return of 8.6% for the same time period.  Public 
funds, however, averaged significantly lower returns: 5.6% annually for the past 
five years and 3.1% in FY 1981.”); id. at 5 (stating that “improvements in the 
performance of the funds can relieve some of the pressures on the state and its 
employees to increase contributions.”); id. at 23 (“The Commission believes that 
inferior performance by the funds in recent years was due in part to compliance 
with statutory provisions.”). 
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962 N.E.2d 165, 167 (finding that the employer’s reduction in the duration of an 
existing non-solicitation agreement from 2 years to 1 year was not legal 
consideration to support a new non-solicitation agreement the employee entered 
into because the employee “was already obligated to not compete against” the 
employer); Ross v. May Co., 377 Ill.App.3d 387, 392, 880 N.E.2d 210, 215 (1st Dist. 
2007) (finding that although an employer had offered an employee additional 
benefits such as paid personal days, disability insurance and a retirement savings 
plan, these additional benefits were offered to all employees and were not part of 
a bargained-for exchange with the employee to support a modification of the 
employer’s binding employee handbook). 
[203] 40 ILCS 5/2-124; 40 ILCS 5/14-131; 40 ILCS 5/15-155; 40 ILCS 5/16-158. 
[204] 40 ILCS 5/2-125; 40 ILCS 5/14-132; 40 ILCS 5/15-156; 40 ILCS 5/16-158.2. 
[205] Compare 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., Senate Bill 2404, at 53, 85, 127, and 
173 available at:http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/98/SB/PDF/09800SB2404en 
g.pdf (making the state “contractually obligated” to make pension contributions 
under the 1995 funding plan) with 40 ILCS 5/2-125; 40 ILCS 5/14-132; 40 ILCS 
5/15-156; 40 ILCS 5/16-158.2 (lacking such language). 
[206] See 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., House Proceedings, Dec. 3, 2013, at 31-32 
(colloquy between House Speaker Madigan, principal House sponsor of Senate Bill 
1, and Representative Fortner where Representative Fortner asked with respect to 
the “funding guarantee” whether “the Legislature would still have the power 
through the statutory process “ to “change the number that would be required for 
us to pay[?]” and the House Speaker answered, “The answer is yes.”). 
[207] 30 ILCS 122/20; 30 ILCS 122/25; 40 ILCS 5/2-125; 40 ILCS 5/14-132; 40 
ILCS 5/15-156; 40 ILCS 5/16-158.2. 
[208] 30 ILCS 122/20; 30 ILCS 122/25; 40 ILCS 5/2-125; 40 ILCS 5/14-132; 40 
ILCS 5/15-156; 40 ILCS 5/16-158.2. 
[209] See 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., House Proceedings, Dec. 3, 2013, at 31-33 
(colloquy between House Speaker Madigan, principal House sponsor of Senate Bill 
1, and Representative Fortner regarding payment amounts). 
[210] 40 ILCS 5/2-165; 40 ILCS 5/14-155; 40 ILCS 5/15-200; 40 ILCS 5/16-205; 
40 ILCS 5/20-121; 40 ILCS 5/123; 40 ILCS 5/20-124; 40 ILCS 5/20-125. 
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[211] 40 ILCS 5/2-165; 40 ILCS 5/14-155; 40 ILCS 5/15-200; 40 ILCS 5/16-205. 
[212] 40 ILCS 5/7-109; 40 ILCS 5/15-106; 40 ILCS 5/16-106. 
[213] 40 ILCS 5/7-116; 40 ILCS 5/7-139; 40 ILCS 5/9-219; 40 ILCS 5/9-220; 40 
ILCS 5/14-104.3; 40 ILCS 5/14-106; 40 ILCS 5/15-112; 40 ILCS 5/15-113.4; 40 
ILCS 5/16-121; 40 ILCS 5/16-127; 40 ILCS 5/17-134. 
[214] 5 ILCS 315/7.5. 
[215] Id. 
[216] Complaint, Heaton v. Quinn, No. 2013 CH 28406 (Cir. Ct. Cook County); 
Complaint, Ill. State Employees Ass’n v. Bd. of Trustees of the State Employees 
Retirement System, No. 2014 CH 3 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon County); 
Complaint, Retired State Employees Ass’n v. Quinn, No. 2014 CH 1 (Cir. Ct. 
Sangamon County); Harrison v. Quinn, No. 2014 CH 48 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon 
County) [hereinafter “We Are One Complaint”]; State Universities Annuitants’ 
Ass’n v. State Universities Retirement System, 2014 MR 207 (Cir. Ct. Champaign 
County) [hereinafter “SUAA Complaint”]. 
[217] Complaint, Heaton v. Quinn, No. 2013 CH 28406 (Cir. Ct. Cook County); 
Complaint, Ill. State Employees Ass’n v. Bd. of Trustees of the State Employees 
Retirement System, No. 2014 CH 3 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon County); 
Complaint, Retired State Employees Ass’n v. Quinn, No. 2014 CH 1 (Cir. Ct. 
Sangamon County); We Are One Complaint; SUAA Complaint. 
[218] The complaints were filed in circuit courts in Cook, Sangamon (7th Judicial 
District), and Champaign (6th Judicial District) Counties. 
[219] Complaint, Heaton v. Quinn, No. 2013 CH 28406 (Cir. Ct. Cook County); 
Complaint, Ill. State Employees Ass’n v. Bd. of Trustees of the State Employees 
Retirement System, No. 2014 CH 3 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon County); 
Complaint, Retired State Employees Ass’n v. Quinn, No. 2014 CH 1 (Cir. Ct. 
Sangamon County); We Are One Complaint. 
[220] Order Granting Motion for Consolidation and Transfer from the Circuit 
Court of Sangamon County, In Re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 CH 48 
(Mar 3, 2014). 
[221] Id. 




[222] Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction, In Re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1 (May 15, 2014). 
[223] We Are One Complaint, at 52-54; SUAA Complaint, at 14. 
[224] Complaint, Ill. State Employees Ass’n v. Bd. of Trustees of the State 
Employees Retirement System, No. 2014 CH 3, at 12-13 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon 
County) [hereinafter “State Employees Association Compliant”]; 
Complaint, Retired State Employees Ass’n v. Quinn, No. 2014 CH 1, at 24-26 (Cir. 
Ct. Sangamon County) [hereinafter "Retired State Employees Association 
Complaint”]. 
[225] State Employees Association Complaint at 27-29; Retired State Employees 
Association Complaint at 17-19. 
[226] Retired State Employees Association Complaint at 14-17. 
[227] See e.g., We Are One Complaint at 43-45. 
[228] We Are One Complaint, at 41. 
[229] Id. at 34-44. 
[230] Id. at 40. 
[231] Id. 
[232] SUAA Complaint, at 19-20; SUAA Motion for Injunctive Relief, at 6-8. 
[233] SUAA Complaint, at 19-20; SUAA Motion for Injunctive Relief, at 6-8,10-13. 
[234] SUAA Complaint, at 20-21. 
[235] SUAA Motion for Injunctive Relief, at 7-8. 
[236] Id. 
[237] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 61 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We Are 
One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 
2014 MR 1, at 59 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to State Employees 
Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 33 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired 
Teachers Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform 
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Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 17 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired 
State Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension 
Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 21 (May 15, 2014). 
[238] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 3-4 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We Are 
One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 
2014 MR 1, at 28-29 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired Teachers 
Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 
MR 1, at 4 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired State Employees 
Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 10-11 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to State 
Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension 
Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 8 (May 15, 2014). 
[239] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation,No. 2014 MR 1, at 3-4 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We Are 
One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 
2014 MR 1, at 28-29 (May 15, 2014). 
[240] Answer and Defenses to We Are One Complaint, Illinois Attorney 
General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 28-30 (May 15, 
2014). 
[241] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 61 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We Are 
One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 
2014 MR 1, at 59-60 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to State Employees 
Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 33-34 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to 
Retired Teachers Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 17-18 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to 
Retired State Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: 
Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 21-22 (May 15, 2014). 
[242] Answer and Defenses to We Are One Complaint, Illinois Attorney 
General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 60 (May 15, 2014). 
[243] See e.g., Answer and Defenses to We Are One Complaint, Illinois Attorney 
General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 28 (May 15, 2014) 
(denying “members of SERS and SURS are entitled to 3% automatic annuity 
increases, but admiting that the Pension Code in effect immediately prior to June 




1, 2014 provided that retired members of SERS, SURS, and TRS would receive each 
year a 3% automatic annuity increase to their pension amount, compounded.”). 
[244] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 3-4 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We Are 
One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 
2014 MR 1, at 28-29 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired Teachers 
Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 
MR 1, at 4 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired State Employees 
Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 10-11 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to State 
Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension 
Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 4 (May 15, 2014). 
[245] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 3-4 (May 15, 2014). 
[246] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 59 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We Are 
One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 
2014 MR 1, at 57(May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired Teachers 
Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 
MR 1, at 15 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired State Employees 
Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 19 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to State 
Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension 
Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 31 (May 15, 2014). 
[247] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 59-64 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We 
Are One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 57-62 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to 
Retired Teachers Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 15-20 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to 
Retired State Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: 
Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 19-24 (May 15, 2014); Answer and 
Defenses to State Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In 
re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 30-36 (May 15, 2014). 
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[248] Answer and Defenses to “We Are One” Complaint, Illinois Attorney 
General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 57-58 (May 15, 
2014). 
[249] Id. 
[250] Id. at 58-59. 
[251] Id. 
[252] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 64-65 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We 
Are One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 57(May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired 
Teachers Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform 
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 20 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired 
State Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension 
Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 23-24 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses 
to State Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: 
Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 35-36 (May 15, 2014). 
[253] Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Joint Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, No. 2014 MR 1 (June 25, 2014).  A separate motion for 
summary judgment was filed by counsel for the Illinois State Employees 
Association and Retired State Employees’ Association arguing that Public Act 98-
0599 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Illinois Constitution by not 
applying the Act’s benefit cuts to judges. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, No. 2014 MR 1 (June. 25, 2014). 
[254] Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Joint Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, No. 2014 MR 1, 1-23 (June 29, 2014). 
[255] Case Management Order, No. 2014 MR 1 (June 30, 2014). 
[256] Doug Finke, Judge:Insurance Ruling Will Factor Into Pension Reform 
Decision, ST. J. REG., Sept. 4, 2014, available at: http://www.sj-r.com/article/20 
140904/NEWS/140909736; Order, No. 2014 MR 1 (Sept. 4, 2014). 
[257] Sidley Austin LLP, Memorandum, The General Assembly’s Authority to 
Enact Comprehensive Pension Reform Legislation: A Response to Eric Madiar 
(April 11, 2011) Mavailable at: docstoc.com/docs/96732951/April-THE-
GENERAL-ASSEMBLY-AUTHORITY-TO-ENACT [hereinafter “Sidley Police 




Power Memo”]; Eric M. Madiar, Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an 
Option for Illinois? An Analysis of Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution 
(Mar. 1, 2011), available at:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1774163. 
[258] Sidley Police Power Memo, supra note 257, at 2-3, 31-32, 37-41. 
[259] Id. at 2-3, 12-14, 30-59. 
[260] Madiar Pension Article, supra note 2,  at 82-84, 96-98, 120-124.44. 
[261] Id. at 47-49  (citing IV Proceedings 2931. 
[262] IV Proceedings 2929-2930 (statements of Delegate Whalen;  see also IV 
Proceedings 2930-31 (statements of Delegates Weisberg, Davis, and Bottino, 
opponents of the Clause, agreeing with Delegate Whalen’s view that pension 
benefits should only be protected under the Illinois Constitution’s Contract 
Clause). 
[263] See Buddell v. Bd. of Trustees, State Universities Retirement Sys., 118 Ill. 2d 
99, 102, 514 N.E.2d 184, 186 (1987). 
[264] Felt v. Bd. of Trustees Judges Retirement Sys., 107 Ill.2d 158, 481 N.E.2d 
698 (1985) (quoting IV Proceedings 2929) (statement of Delegate Kinney). 
[265] Kanerva v, Weems, 2104 IL 115811, at ¶48. 
[266] Felt, 107 Ill.2d  at 167, 481 N.E.2d at 703: Kraus v. Bd. of Trustees of the 
Police Pension Fund of the Village of Niles, 72 Ill. App. 3d 833, 851, 390 N.E.2d 
1281, 1294(1st Dist. 1979). 
[267] See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 22 (expressly subjecting “the right of the 
individual citizen to keep and bear arms” to the “police power”); Kalodimos v. 
Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill.2d 483, (1984) (noting that the 1970 
Constitutional Convention created an individual right to bear arms that is 
expressly “subject only to the police power”); Quilici v. Village of Morton 
Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982). 
[268] Kanerva v, Weems, 2104 IL 115811, at ¶41. 
[269] See Maddox v. Blagojevich, 233 Ill.2d 508, 522, 911 N.E.2d 979, 988 (2009) 
(“The constitution operates as a limitation upon the General Assembly’s sweeping 
authority, not as any grant of power [citation]; thus the General Assembly is free 
to enact any legislation that the constitution does not expressly 
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prohibit[.]”); O’Brien v. White, 219 Ill.2d 86, 100, 846 N.E.2d 116, 124 (2006) 
(explaining, “the General Assembly cannot enact legislation that conflicts with 
specific provisions of the constitution, unless the constitution specifically grants 
the legislature that authority”); People v. Adams, 149 Ill.2d 331, 339-40, 597 
N.E.2d 574, 579 (1992) (“the police power may not be used to violate a positive 
constitutional mandate”); Greenfield v. Russel, 292 Ill.392, 399, 127 N.E. 102, 105 
(1920) (“Our Legislature possesses every power not delegated to some other 
department of the state or to the federal government or not denied to it by the 
Constitution of the state or of the United States.”); Town of Lake View v. The Rose 
Hill Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191, 197 (1873) (“It has been said, the source of [the police 
power] may be readily recognized as flowing from the people in their organized 
capacity, inalienable in its character, but it is difficult to define its boundaries or 
limit its operations.  We are unwilling, however, to concede the existence of an 
indefinable power, superior to the constitution, that may be invoked whenever the 
legislature may deem the public exigency may require it[.]”); see also Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876) (“When the people of the United Colonies separated 
from Great Britain, they changed the form, but not the substance, of their 
government.  They retained for the purposes of government all the powers of the 
British Parliament, and through their State constitutions, or other forms of social 
compact, undertook to give practical effect to such as they deemed necessary for 
the common good and security of life and property.  All the powers which they 
retained committed to their respective States, unless in express terms or by 
implication reserved to themselves.  Subsequently, when it was found necessary 
to establish a national government for national purposes, a part of the powers of 
the States and of the people of the States was granted to the United States and the 
people of the United States.  This grant operated as a further limitation upon the 
States, so that now the governments of the States possess all the powers of 
Parliament of England, except such as have been delegated to the United States or 
reserved to the people.  The reservations by the people are shown in the 
prohibitions of the constitutions.”) (emphasis added); Parkway Bank & Trust Co. 
v. City of Darien, 43 Ill.App.3d 400, 406, 357 N.E.2d 211, 217 (2d Dist. 1976) (“the 
State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on the police 
power than those held to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards”). 
[270] Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897). 
[271] IV Proceedings 2931 (Delegate Green);  see also Peters v. City of Springfield, 
57 Ill.2d 142, 151, 311 N.E.2d 107, 112 (1974) (concluding that the Clause was 
intended to ensure that the pension benefits of public employees could “not be 
defeated by reason of the failure to provide necessary funding”). 




[272] Home Bldg. & Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426-444 (1934); id. at 439 
(stating that the State’s “reserved power cannot be construed as to destroy the 
limitation [of the Contract Clause], nor is the limitation to construed to destroy the 
reserved power in its essential aspects.  They must be construed in harmony with 
each other.”); id. at 443 (same). 
[273] Id. at 426-444. 
[274] General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187-89 (1992). 
[275] People v. Caballas, 221 Ill.2d 282, 313, 851 N.E.2d 26, 45 (Ill. 2006). 
[276] Id. 
[277] Madiar Pension Article, supra note 2, at 94-95. 
[278] Id. 
[279] See IV Proceedings 2926-2931. 
[280] IV Proceedings 2931. 
[281] IV Proceeding 2926 (statements of Delegate Kinney) (“It is definitely the 
intent that an increase in benefits would not be precluded.  Many states tie their 
pension and retirement benefits into a cost of living and raise them from time to 
time.  It is the intent that this amendment would permit so doing if the legislature 
at some future time should decide to do so.”). 
[282] Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811 at ¶¶39-40. 
[283] Schroeder v. Morton Grove Police Pension Bd., 219 Ill. App. 3d 697, 701-02, 
579 N.E.2d 997, 1000-01 (1st Dist. 1991);  Kuhlmann v. Bd. of Trustees of the 
Police Fund of Maywood, 106 Ill. App. 3d 603, 607-608, 435 N.E.2d 1307, 1310-
11 (1st Dist. 1982). 
[284] People ex rel. Merchants’ Savings, Loan & Trust Co. v. Auditor of Public 
Accounts, 30 Ill. 434, 435-38 (1863). 
[285] Cornelius, supra note 20, at 35, 44. 
[286] JOHN H. KRENKEL, ILLINOIS INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS: 1818-1848 at 149 
(1958), available at:https://archive.org/download/illinois internal 00kren/illin 
oisinternal00kren.pdf (last visited July 24, 2014).  In 1841, the State defaulted on 
annual interest payments it owed on the internal improvement debts, which 
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totaled over $10.5 million.  That indebtedness was described as “almost 
insurmountable” because the State’s annual interest payment was nearly 
$800,000, but the State only collected about $98,500 a year in revenue for general 
government expenses.  Id. Efforts to repudiate these debts were blocked by 
Governor Thomas Ford in 1842 who succeeded in forcing the State “to assume its 
responsibilities and save its credit.”  Cornelius, supra note 21, at 
27. KRENKEL supra at 178-90; Theodore Pease. The Frontier State: 1818-
1848, in THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF ILLINOIS 316-27 (1918) available at: https:// 
archive.org/download/frontierstate18100peas/frontierstate18100peas.pdf. The 
State did not pay off its internal improvement debts until the 
1880s.  KRENKEL supra note 286, at 215-16. 
[287] Cornelius, supra note 20, at 27, 35, 44; KRENKEL, supra note 286, at 209-
210 (describing the drafting history of Article XV at the 1847 Illinois Constitutional 
Convention); People ex rel. Merchants’ Saving, Loan & Trust Co., 30 Ill. at 439-
440 (detailing Article XV’s purpose and background). 
[288] 1861 Illinois Laws at 208. 
[289] Id. at 208-09; People ex rel. Merchants’ Saving, Loan & Trust Co., 30 Ill. at 
436-38. 
[290] People ex rel. Merchants’ Saving, Loan & Trust Co., 30 Ill. at 437. 
[291] Id. at 439-445. 
[292] Id. at 440. 
[293] Id. 
[294] Id. at 444. 
[295] Id. at 445. 
[296] Henry Ford, Interview by Charles N. Wheeler in the CHI. TRIB., May 25, 1916 
appearing in CLIFTON FADIMAN, THE LITTLE BROWN BOOK OF ANECDOTES 213 (1995). 
  





By, Student Editorial Board: 
PETER BRIERTON, CHRISTINA JACOBSON, AND IAN JONES 
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations 
Report.  It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the 
public employee collective bargaining statutes, The First Amendment and the 
Illinois Constitution. 
I.  IELRB DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Bargaining Units 
In Uni Faculty Organizations, IEA-NEA and Board of Trustees of the University 
of Illinois, Case No. 2013-RC-0008-S, 30 PERI ¶299 (IELRB 2014), the IELRB 
affirmed an Administrative Law Judge decision that a bargaining unit of faculty at 
Uni High School, a laboratory high school affiliated with the University of Illinois, 
was appropriate. The faculty at Uni High who were seeking representation were 
considered, under the university statutes, to be “nontenure-track faculty 
members” of the University. 
The IELRB observed that the petitioned-for unit was not one listed in its 
regulations setting forth presumptively appropriate units for the University of 
Illinois.  Under those regulations, the unit could still be appropriate if the union 
seeking the unit could establish by clear and convincing evidence that: 
1. the unit is otherwise appropriate under section 7 of the Illinois Educational 
Labor Relations Act; 
2. special circumstances and compelling justifications make it appropriate for the 
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board to establish a unit different from those 
set forth [in the regulations]; 
3. establishment of a different unit will not cause undue fragmentation of 
bargaining units or proliferation of bargaining units. Undue fragmentation of 
bargaining units or proliferation of bargaining units is such as to threaten to 
interrupt services, cause labor instability, and cause continual collective 
bargaining and a multitude of representation proceedings. 
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The IELRB found the unit appropriate under section 7 because the Uni faculty 
shared a community of interest.  The IELRB relied on, among many things, the fact 
that Uni High faculty members reported to individuals at Uni High, not the 
University, Uni High faculty were subject to a different evaluation process than are 
University faculty, and Uni High faculty members taught secondary education 
rather than higher education. The IELRB relied on these factors plus a distinct 
school year and distinct school day for Uni faculty as well as different funding 
sources for Uni High School and the rest of the University to establish significant 
differences between Uni High faculty and University faculty. Further, the IELRB 
determined that, because of the differences between Uni High and the rest of the 
University,  any labor dispute would be “physically and otherwise limited to Uni 
High School” if the IELRB were to approve the bargaining unit as appropriate. 
Accordingly, the IELRB found no evidence that allowing Uni High faculty 
members to collectively bargain would cause undue fragmentation of the 
bargaining unit or put any strain on the labor relations process. 
B.  Protected Activity 
In  Amy Whiting-Singer and Mid-Valley Special Education Cooperative, Case No. 
2013-CA-0077-C, 30 PERI ¶ 297 (IELRB 2014), the IELRB held that allegations 
that Mid-Valley Special Education Cooperative violated Section 14(a) of the IELRA 
by terminating Whiting-Singer in retaliation for advocating, on behalf of her 
students, that her employer follow “federal and state laws related to educating 
individuals with disabilities” fell outside the IELRB’s jurisdiction.  The IELRB held 
that advocating on the behalf of students was not protected activity under the Act. 
Section 3 of the IELRA guarantees employees the right to engage in concerted 
activity for mutual aid and protection.  The IELRB emphasized that Whiting-
Singer never advocated on behalf of other employees. Her alleged advocacy for 
students fell outside of Section 3.  Accordingly the IELRB found the charge to be 
outside its jurisdiction and dismissed the charge. 
II.  IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Subjects of Bargaining 
In SEIU Local 73 and City of Chicago, No. L-CA 10-061. 31 PERI ¶ 3 (ILRB Local 
Panel, 2014), the ILRB held that the use of hidden cameras to discipline employees 
was a mandatory subject of bargaining and, therefore, the City of Chicago violated 
Sections 10(a)(4) and (1) of the IPLRA when the City failed to notify and negotiate 
with SEIU. 




After a series of break-ins at the West Pullman Library, the City installed two 
hidden surveillance cameras on the premises to help the police department capture 
intruders. The City did not notify the bargaining unit employees about the 
installation of the cameras, did not bargain with the Union about the installation 
and used the footage from the cameras to discipline bargaining unit employees. 
The Local Panel concluded that the use of cameras for this purpose amounted to a 
unilateral change in a mandatory subject of bargaining without granting notice to 
the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative. The ILRB distinguished 
between the use of cameras for the exclusive reason to capture intruders, which 
would be a permissive subject of bargaining, and the use of the cameras to 
discipline employees as being a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
The ILRB noted that although the city installed the cameras to catch an intruder, 
the city did not limit the scope of the surveillance when it placed the cameras in 
places that monitored bargaining unit employees. The ILRB also found it 
convincing that the conduct of bargaining unit employees was recorded 24 hours 
a day and 7 days a week. The ILRB reasoned further that the use of cameras to 
catch intruders wasn’t the only reason the city installed the cameras. The ILRB 
found it persuasive that subsequently the City disciplined an employee for 
damaging a copy machine after seeing the employee’s behavior on footage from the 
cameras. The Local Panel reasoned that if the City only intended to catch intruders, 
it could have informed the Union, installed visible cameras, and only recorded 
when no one was in the building (which was when the previous break-ins 
occurred). 
III.  FIRST AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Fair Share Fees 
In Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014), the Supreme Court held that the State 
of Illinois and SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana violated the First Amendment 
rights of personal assistants who provide in home services for Medicaid recipients 
and who were not members of the union when it compelled them to pay fair share 
fees to the union, representing their share of the costs of representation.  The Court 
held that its prior decision in Abood v. Detroit v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 
U.S. 209 (1977) which had upheld the constitutionality of fair share fees confined 
to the non-member of the union’s pro rata share of expenditures germane to the 
union’s collective representation functions. The Court questioned the continuing 
validity of Abood, observing that the line drawn in that case between union 
political and ideological expenditures, which could not constitutionally be charged 
to non-members, and  expenditures germane to collective bargaining which may 
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be charged has turned out not to be a very bright line as issues of public employee 
compensation have captured the limelight in public discourse.  While not 
revisiting Abood in this case, the Court confined its holding to “full fledged” public 
employees.  It held Abood inapplicable to the personal assistants who it 
characterized as employees of the State only for purposes of collective bargaining 
but are otherwise employees of the Medicaid recipients who receive their services. 
B. Free Speech 
In Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2004), the Supreme Court held that a public 
employee’s sworn testimony given under subpoena is citizen speech, eligible for 
First Amendment protection.  The Court clarified its prior decision in Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), which had held that speech made as an employee is 
not entitled to First Amendment protection against adverse employment action. 
In 2006, Lane was hired by Central Alabama Community College (CACC) as the 
Director of Community Intensive Training for Youth (“CITY”). Lane conducted an 
audit of the program’s expenses. The audit found that Suzanne Schmitz, an 
Alabama State Representative, was on the CITY payroll but not reporting to the 
CITY office or performing any work.  Despite warnings from the CACC president 
and its attorney, Lane terminated Schmitz for failure to perform her work duties. 
Following Schmitz’s termination, the FBI conducted an investigation of her 
employment with CITY. Lane testified before a federal grand jury regarding his 
reasons for terminating Schmitz. In August 2008, Lane also testified under 
subpoena at Schmitz’s criminal trial. Lane was terminated in January 2009. 
He  filed suit against Franks, his supervisor, alleging that Franks retaliated against 
him for his testimony against Schmitz in violation of the First Amendment. 
The district court granted Frank’s motion for summary judgment, despite genuine 
issues of material fact concerning Frank’s motivation. Relying on Garcetti, the 
district court  found that there was no clear violation because Lane’s speech was 
part of his official job duties. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Frank was 
entitled to qualified immunity in his personal capacity because Lane’s free speech 
right was not clearly established in the law. The Eleventh Circuit also found “that 
Lane spoke as an employee and not as a citizen because he was acting pursuant to 
his official duties when he investigated Schmitz’s employment.” 
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The Court defined the 
issue as whether a public employee’s “truthful subpoenaed testimony, outside the 
course of their ordinary job responsibilities” was protected by the First 
Amendment. 




The Court distinguished Garcetti, as holding that an “internal memorandum 
prepared by a prosecutor in the course of his ordinary job responsibility 
constituted unprotected employee speech.” In contrast, the Court found that 
Lane’s speech was not within the scope of his employment duties, even though 
Lane acquired the information for his testimony in the course of his employment. 
The Court emphasized the importance that truthful testimony under oath by a 
public employee, regardless of any official obligations, also carries an  obligation 
as a citizen to render sworn testimony which sets it apart from speech made purely 
in the capacity of an employee. 
The Court turned to the two-part inquiry regarding citizen speech: (1) did the 
speech involve matters of public concern, and (2) did the government have an 
adequate justification, as an employer, for treating the employee differently than 
the public at large. The court found that Lane’s testimony regarding “corruption in 
a public program and misuse of state funds” to be “a matter of significant public 
concern.” Further, the Court noted that such a substantial matter of public concern 
created an exceedingly high bar for the government to attempt to justify their 
actions. In light of the truthful nature of Lane’s testimony, and the significance of 
the issue at hand, the Court found Lane’s speech entitled to protection under the 
First Amendment. 
The Court, however, affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s finding that Franks in his 
individual capacity was entitled to qualified immunity from damages because of 
the lack of clear precedent in the Eleventh Circuit at the time Franks terminated 
Lane. 
IV. ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Pension Clause 
In Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, the Illinois Supreme Court held that “the 
State’s provision of health insurance premium subsidies for retirees is a benefit of 
membership in a pension or retirement system within the meaning of Article XIII, 
Section 5, of the Illinois Constitution, and a statute that allowed for reduced 
subsidies for health insurance of retirees and their beneficiaries violates the State 
Constitution.  Article XIII, Section 5 provides that that “[m]embership in any 
pension or retirement system of the State . . . shall be an enforceable contractual 
relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.”  The court, 
reasoned that the health insurance subsidies are benefits of membership in the 
retirement system. The court further reasoned that, based on the clear language in 
Article XIII, Section 5, the language was intended to include subsidized health care 
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benefits. Further, the court stated that if the constitution’s drafters had wanted to 
only protect annuity benefits they could have so specified, however they did not. 
  
